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What good are theories if they cannot be tested? Election law has wrestled
with this question over the last generation. Two new theories have emerged
during this period that reject conventional rights-and-interests balancing. In its
place, the responsiveness theory asserts that legislators’ positions should be
sensitive to changes in the views of their constituents. Similarly, the alignment
theory claims that voters’ and legislators’ preferences should be congruent.
Unfortunately, both of these theories share a common flaw: They provide no
way for anyone to tell whether electoral policies improve or worsen
responsiveness or alignment. They operate at too normative a level to be useful
to practically minded courts or policymakers. They are caught in clouds of
abstraction.
This Article is an attempt to pull the theories down from the clouds. In the
last few years, data has become available, for the first time, on voters’ and
legislators’ preferences at the state legislative level. We use this data to calculate
responsiveness and alignment for both individual legislators and whole
legislative chambers, across the country and over the last two decades. We also
pair these calculations with a new database of state electoral policies that covers
the areas of (1) franchise access, (2) party regulation, (3) campaign finance, (4)
redistricting, and (5) governmental structure. This pairing enables us to estimate
the policies’ actual effects on responsiveness and alignment.
Our results mean that laws’ representational impact now is a matter of
empirics, not conjecture. Courts that wish to decide cases in accordance with the
responsiveness or alignment theories may do so by consulting our findings.
Policymakers who aim to enact beneficial reforms may do the same. And
academics no longer have an excuse for debating the theories from a purely
normative perspective. Now that the “is” has been intertwined with the “ought,”
the “is” no longer may be ignored.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two major theories of election law share a common flaw. They both assert
that electoral policies should be assessed based on whether they promote or
inhibit a certain kind of relationship between voters’ and representatives’
preferences. But neither theory offers any way to tell whether policies actually
produce this relationship. Neither theory, that is, offers any practical guidance to
courts or policymakers who wish to heed its recommendations.
Take the responsiveness theory that Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes
pioneered, and that is now the dominant approach in the election law literature.1

1
For some of the key articulations of the theory, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political
Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); and Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court,
2003 Term; Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004). For a
sense of the theory’s centrality in the election law literature, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ELECTION LAW 139 (2003) (“The Issacharoff-Pildes model is becoming the new election law orthodoxy . . . .”);
Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) (describing
the “emerging consensus” in favor of the Issacharoff-Pildes approach); and Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of
Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
HARV. L. REV. 649, 651 (2002) (noting how “attention in the field has shifted . . . . toward an emphasis on
electoral competition”).
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The theory contends that officeholders’ positions should be responsive to the
views of their constituents. If the constituents’ preferences shift in a particular
direction, then so should the officeholders’ preferences. But how are we
supposed to know whether a given policy—a photo identification requirement,
say, or a limit on campaign contributions—increases or decreases
responsiveness? How are we supposed to operationalize the value that
Issacharoff and Pildes have identified? Unfortunately, the theory provides no
answer.2
Or take the alignment theory that many political scientists endorse, and that
one of us has applied to election law in earlier work.3 The theory argues that
representatives’ positions should be congruent with voters’ views. If voters hold
certain preferences, then so should their representatives. But how do we figure
out whether a given reform—an open primary, say, or an independent
redistricting commission—is aligning or misaligning? How do we convert the
abstract ideal of preference congruence into usable instructions for judges and
legislators? Again, alas, the theory comes up empty.
To be fair, this flaw in the responsiveness and alignment theories was
unavoidable until very recently. To determine the effects of different electoral
policies, it is necessary to have (1) substantial policy variation across time and
space; (2) a measure of voters’ preferences; and (3) a measure of legislators’
preferences.4 At the congressional level, data on voters’ and legislators’
preferences has long been available, but there is insufficient policy variation to
come to any robust conclusions. Too many rules are set federally and thus do not
differ year by year or state by state.5 At the state legislative level, conversely,
states have experimented with all sorts of electoral policies, but in the past there
was little data on voters’ or legislators’ preferences. The districts were too small
and the politicians too obscure for much information to be gathered.
This situation has changed dramatically over the past few years. As to voters’
preferences, a pair of political scientists merged a series of surveys and then used
a new statistical technique to produce public opinion estimates at the state
legislative district level.6 One of us also compiled presidential election results

2
Other scholars who have made this point include Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the
Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1423 (2008) (“[I]t is difficult to ascertain when the right
level of partisan competition has been achieved.”); and Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 371, 376 (2004) (observing that “structural considerations are difficult to manage”).
3
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014); see also,
e.g., Andrew Rehfield, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of
Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 219 (2009) (“The reigning view within
empirical political science presumes the delegate model of representation as the ideal.”); Andrew Sabl, Does
“Democracy” Mean that Outcomes Should Track Voter Preferences? Why Empirical Political Scientists
Assume the Answer Is Yes and Political Theorists Assume It’s No 4 (Sept. 1, 2012) (noting that “many political
scientists . . . assume . . . something like the correspondence theory”).
4
It also is helpful to have a large number of cases to study. While there are only 435 congressional
districts in the country, there are more than 7000 state legislative districts—a much more suitable data universe
for state-level analysis.
5
This is most true with respect to campaign finance and governmental structure policies.
6
See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in
Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330 (2013) (acquiring pool of 275,000 respondents by
merging surveys).
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aggregated by state legislative district for a substantial number of prior elections.7
As to legislators’ preferences, another pair of political scientists assembled roll
call voting data for all fifty states and then used this information to calculate state
legislator ideal points.8 Still another political scientist estimated state legislators’
ideologies by analyzing the identities of their campaign donors.9 Lastly, we
perused an array of primary and secondary sources in order to code several dozen
state electoral policies over a two-decade period. Our database, the most
extensive of its kind, includes policies in the areas of (1) franchise access; (2)
party regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4) redistricting; and (5) governmental
structure.
Armed with this newly available data, we seek in this Article to redress the
empirical deficiencies of the responsiveness and alignment theories. We seek, in
other words, to determine what the implications of different electoral policies
actually are for responsiveness and alignment. We carry out our analysis at the
levels of both the state legislative district and the state legislative chamber. This
dual approach allows us to investigate both dyadic representation (i.e., the
relationship between a particular legislator and her constituents) and collective
representation (i.e., the relationship between an entire legislative body and all of
the voters in the state).10 We also carry out our analysis over the 1992-2013
period and across all fifty states.11 This wide temporal and spatial lens takes full
advantage of the states’ policy variation and enhances our ability to reach
conclusions about causality.
At the dyadic level, we find that most state legislators are misaligned with
their constituents. Democrats typically are too liberal for their districts’ voters,
while Republicans typically are too conservative. This misalignment also is not
symmetric. Republicans tend to be more misaligned than Democrats, and their
level of misalignment has risen in recent years (while that of Democrats has
fallen). At the collective level, both alignment and responsiveness vary markedly
from state to state, but not very much from year to year. The median legislator
also is too liberal in states governed by Democrats, and too conservative in
Republican-run states. And the median legislator is positively responsive to
changes in public opinion in most states, but swings in the opposite direction
from the electorate in a handful of outliers.
Turning to the electoral policies that are the Article’s focus, we find that
several of them have positive effects on alignment and responsiveness, even with
rigorous controls included in our models. For example, limits on individual

7
This was Rogers. See Eric M. McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems
and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337 (2014) (using this data).
8
See Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 530 (2011).
9
See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL SCI. (forthcoming 2014).
However, as we discuss in Section II.A, infra, we are unable to use Bonica’s estimates in our analysis because
of their lower reliability at the state legislative level.
10
See Robert Weissberg, Collective Vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 535,
535-37 (1978).
11
The one minor exception is that we study only chamber-level responsiveness in Nebraska, since its
legislators do not have official partisan affiliations.
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campaign contributions improve alignment at the district level, likely because the
donors whose giving is constrained tend to be ideologically extreme. Similarly,
the use of an independent commission to draw district lines improves alignment
at the chamber level, probably because a commission (unlike politicians) has no
incentive to gerrymander. And sore loser laws, which ban candidates who lose in
the primaries from running again in the general election, improve alignment at
both the district and chamber levels. This effect may arise due to defeated
candidates seeking a second bite at the apple, and thus splitting their party’s vote,
in the absence of these laws.
However, the story is not as rosy for all of the policies we examine. For
instance, certain types of open primaries worsen both alignment and
responsiveness, likely because they fail to attract more moderate voters to the
polls. Likewise, public financing schemes are misaligning at the district level,
probably because the public funds tend to be tied to donations from polarized
individual donors. Term limits also reduce district-level alignment, as termlimited legislators evidently represent their constituents less ably. And policies
that restrict access to the franchise (such as photo identification requirements)
have little discernible impact on alignment. They may influence turnout, but they
do not seem to affect representation.
Our findings have important implications for courts, policymakers, and
academics alike. Courts, first, may consult our results to evaluate claims that
policies should be upheld because they promote alignment or responsiveness.12
Courts have struggled with these claims in the past, but now arguments about
how policies affect representation may be assessed empirically rather than
intuitively. Our findings also bolster certain judicial doctrines while undermining
others. For example, courts’ tendency to uphold franchise restrictions13 seems
acceptable given their minor impact on alignment; and courts’ aggressive
scrutiny of open primaries14 may be sensible too given their negative effects on
alignment and responsiveness. But courts should be more tolerant of limits on
individual donors,15 which increase alignment; and should prod states more
forcefully to adopt redistricting commissions,16 which are aligning as well.
Next, policymakers who hope to improve representation may draw on our
results to identify policies that serve this goal (and to avoid policies that do not).
The areas in which representational gains are most attainable, in our view, are
campaign finance and redistricting.17 Several reforms in these areas produce
benefits in both district-level and chamber-level alignment. These reforms should

12
For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that address alignment, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at
316-20. For a similar discussion focused on responsiveness, see Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 605-06.
13
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Indiana photo identification requirement).
14
See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (voiding California blanket primary).
15
Instead, the Court has struck down limits on individual expenditures, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), on aggregate individual contributions, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality
opinion), and on certain non-aggregate individual contributions, see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
16
Instead, the Court has upheld egregious gerrymanders enacted by the elected branches. See, e.g., League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
17
Sore loser laws also are aligning, but they already are in place in most states.

5

Realities of Reform

be a high priority for leaders who want American democracy to function more
effectively. Conversely, there is less reason for these leaders to devote their
energies to franchise access, party regulation, or governmental structure. Most
franchise access laws only influence representation at the margins, while several
common reforms of party regulation and governmental structure are misaligning.
In these areas, inaction, or even the repeal of existing rules, is preferable to new
regulatory activity.18
Lastly, our analysis gives rise to both a research agenda for political
scientists and theoretical insights for legal academics. Among the many
worthwhile sequels that political scientists should consider are: generating
reliable measures of legislator ideology that vary over time; coding electoral
policies in non-binary fashion; and using voter surveys to place voters’ and state
legislators’ ideal points on the same scale. Law professors tend not to perform
such quantitative work, but our results also should be valuable to them due to the
light they shed on the alignment and responsiveness theories. For one thing, it
now is possible to apply the theories—to determine with some confidence how
different policies affect representation. This is a major milestone in the theories’
evolution. For another, it turns out that the responsiveness theory is much less
useful in practice than the alignment theory. Far fewer policies have any impact
on responsiveness, meaning that it usually cannot be used to distinguish sound
from unsound reforms.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the theoretical backdrop for
our empirical investigation. It articulates the responsiveness and alignment
theories, summarizes the existing literature on the theories, and identifies certain
gaps in this literature. Part II, the analytical core of the Article, presents our
findings on the effects of different electoral policies on responsiveness and
alignment. It describes the data we use, explains our methodological choices, and
sets forth the results of our various models. Lastly, Part III considers what our
conclusions mean for courts, policymakers, and academics. It argues that all three
sets of actors must rethink their approaches to election law if they hope to
construct a responsive and aligned political system.
One more prefatory note: This Article is far from the last word on how
electoral policies affect representation. In fact, it is more like the first word. All
of the datasets we rely on are very new, and surely will be refined in the future.
In addition, a single paper cannot possibly assess with sufficient rigor several
dozen policies spanning five distinct areas. We believe our analytical techniques
are valid and generate reliable results. We also believe there is value in breadth
of coverage, in seeking to evaluate simultaneously a range of reforms. But we
recognize that more work is necessary before our findings can be seen as
definitive and not merely suggestive. In fact, we plan to do a good deal of this
work ourselves as we continue to execute the project that this Article
commences.

18
We decline to comment on what reforms should be pursued by policymakers who affirmatively want
misalignment in their favor.
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II. THEORETICAL BACKDROP
Before delving into empirics, it is important to say a few words about the
election law theories whose weaknesses we hope to rectify. We open this Part,
then, by outlining the key elements of the responsiveness and alignment theories.
Both theories are structuralist, in the argot of election law scholars, because they
emphasize structural features of our political system rather than individual rights
claims. Both theories are concerned as well with achieving a certain kind of
relationship between voters’ and representatives’ preferences—a responsive
relationship in one case and a congruent relationship in the other.
Next, we summarize the existing political science literature on the impact of
different electoral policies on responsiveness and alignment. A number of studies
do attempt to quantify these concepts and to analyze their linkages to electoral
rules. Unfortunately, as we further explain in this Part, most of these efforts are
deficient in significant respects. Very few studies to date have succeeded in
measuring both voters’ and representatives’ preferences at the level—the state
legislative—at which the greatest policy variation arises. As a result, current
scholarship does not provide courts and policymakers with the necessary tools to
operationalize the responsiveness and alignment theories.
A. Responsiveness and Alignment
In recent years, the central cleavage in election law has pitted rights-oriented
against structuralist theories.19 In one camp are scholars who argue (along with
some Supreme Court Justices) that the rights burdens imposed by electoral
regulations should be balanced against the state interests that the regulations
serve.20 The burdens should be permitted only if they are less substantial than the
gains for the countervailing interests. In the opposite corner are commentators
who maintain that such rights-and-interests balancing ignores the structural
dynamics that are truly at stake in electoral disputes.21 These dynamics,
summarized by Pildes as “the interlocking relationships of the institutions . . .
that organize the democratic system,”22 should be the focus of judges as well as
legislators.
The responsiveness and alignment theories that are the subject of this Article
both are structuralist approaches.23 Both call attention to democratic values that
inhere in our political system as a whole, not to individual rights such as speech

19
For some of the abundant literature on this cleavage, see HASEN, supra note 1; Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005); Dawood, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 1; and
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999).
20
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 292-95 (describing these scholars and Justices as well as their
arguments).
21
See id. at 295-98 (describing these commentators and their arguments).
22
Pildes, supra note 1, at 41.
23
See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 19, at 1607 (“Professor Samuel Issacharoff and I attempt to . . . develop[]
one structural aim that the history of American law and democracy suggests should be a particular focal point
for courts.”); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 299 (“Alignment is a quintessential structural value—a value that
matters to the entire polity, not to any particular group or individual . . . .”).
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or the franchise. To determine whether a given policy is lawful or advisable, the
theories advise that its implications for the relevant democratic value be
ascertained. Its implications for individual rights—or for state interests
unconnected to the democratic value—are irrelevant.
Beginning with the responsiveness theory, some readers may be puzzled by
our label for it. Issacharoff and Pildes, the chief proponents of the theory, are best
known for their commitment to electoral competition, not responsiveness. But
they have made clear in numerous works that they view competition as an
instrumental rather than an intrinsic value. The reason why they regard
competition as desirable is their belief that it tends to produce a responsive
political order. Responsiveness, not competition, is their ultimate aim. As they
write in a seminal article, “Only through an appropriately competitive partisan
environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized: that .
. . the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”24
Unfortunately, Issacharoff and Pildes are not always clear as to which output
should be responsive to which input at which level. On the output side, they refer
at different times to elected officials’ “preferences,”25 to “policy outcomes,”26
and to “representation” itself.27 On the input side, similarly, they mention the
“interests of voters”28 on some occasions and the “preferences of the electorate”
on others.29 And with respect to level, sometimes they argue that individual
legislators should be responsive to their own constituents,30 and elsewhere they
claim that the entire political system should be responsive to all of the voters in
the jurisdiction.31 Probably the fairest reading of their position is that they want
all of these outputs to be responsive to all of these inputs at all of these levels.
Legislators’ preferences and policy outcomes should be responsive to voters’
preferences and interests within particular districts and whole jurisdictions.
In contrast to the responsiveness theory, the alignment theory is not
concerned with the rate of change of some output given a shift in some input.
Instead, the theory asserts that the levels of the input and of the output should
correspond. At any moment in time, regardless of whatever swings have occurred
or will occur, the input and the output should assume the same value along some

24
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646; see also, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615
(“[C]ompetition [is] critical to the ability of voters to ensure the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters'
interests . . . .”); Pildes, supra note 1, at 125 (describing as key question for American politics whether “parties
will face sufficient competitive pressures to keep them appropriately responsive to diverse interests”).
The other democratic value that Issacharoff and Pildes believe is advanced by competition is
accountability. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 623 (“[D]emocracy is defined primarily by the
accountability of the elected to the electors, an accountability that is in turn shaped through competitive
elections.”); Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J.
685, 688 (2004) (“[O]f the various structural goals of democracy, the one courts ought to focus on is ensuring
competition and, through it, electoral accountability.”). We do not attempt to measure accountability in this
Article.
25
Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615, 628 n.139.
26
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646.
27
Id. at 649, 673
28
Id. at 680.
29
Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615.
30
See, e.g., id.; Pildes, supra note 24, at 686.
31
See, e.g. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646; Pildes, supra note 1, at 42, 64 n.158.
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common metric.32 (Of course, this means that alignment and responsiveness are
related. A degree of responsiveness is necessary to achieve alignment whenever
an input changes.)33
At least as one of us has articulated it, the alignment theory offers a good
deal of specificity as to which outputs should align with which inputs at which
levels.34 In increasing order of ambitiousness, the relevant outputs are (1)
legislators’ partisan affiliations, i.e., the party to which they belong; (2)
legislators’ policy preferences, i.e., their specific issue positions and overall
ideologies; and (3) public policy outcomes, i.e., the actual enactments of the
elected branches. Also in increasing order, the relevant inputs are (1) voters’
partisan preferences, i.e., the party they would like to see in office; and (2)
voters’ policy preferences, i.e., their specific issue positions and overall
ideologies. And alignment can be conceptualized at the levels of (1) the
individual district, in which the district’s representative and median voter should
align; and (2) the entire legislative chamber, in which the body’s median member
and the jurisdiction’s median voter should do so.
Putting these pieces together, we can construct a taxonomy of alignment.35
Partisan alignment refers to the congruence of legislators’ partisan affiliations
and voters’ partisan preferences. Policy preference alignment (preference
alignment for short) denotes the correspondence of legislators’ and voters’ policy
positions. And policy outcome alignment (outcome alignment for short) means
that public policy outcomes correspond to voters’ policy views. Moreover, all
three types of alignment apply to the levels of both the individual district and the
entire legislative chamber. (Though outcome alignment at the district level is
essentially irrelevant since so little policy is set by individual constituencies).
As we explain below,36 we choose to focus on preference alignment in this
Article, at both the district and chamber levels. No single project could possibly
analyze how all of the forms of alignment are related to all of the electoral rules
that shape our political system. Because of the imprecision of Issacharoff and
Pildes’s account, we also apply the taxonomy of alignment to responsiveness.
We thus assess preference responsiveness—the rate of change of legislators’
policy positions given shifts in voters’ policy views—at the chamber level. While

32
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301; see also, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The
Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148 (2012) (“[B]y responsiveness, we mean a positive
correlation between opinion and policy; by congruence, we mean that policy actually matches majority
opinion.”); Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and Individuals in a Common
Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels 2 (Apr. 25, 2011) (noting that
responsiveness “denotes the idea that legislators . . . respond to their constituents’ policy preferences” while
congruence requires that “the preferences of constituents and the representative should match in some common
metric”).
33
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301 n.81.
34
See id. at 304-13.
35
See id. Careful readers may note that our terminology is slightly different here than in Stephanopoulos’s
earlier work. What he previously called “policy alignment” we now refer to as “preference alignment.”
36
See infra Section I.C. Of course, preference alignment is related to partisan alignment and outcome
alignment. Because each party’s legislators usually hold similar ideologies, partisan alignment tends to lead to
preference alignment. Similarly, because the median legislator is often the pivotal legislator for purposes of
policy enactment, preference alignment tends to lead to outcome alignment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3,
at 310-11.
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our methodological decisions exclude several kinds of alignment and
responsiveness from our study, we trust that our findings still will be of
substantial interest.
B. Prior Findings
Not surprisingly, the scholars who have advanced the responsiveness and
alignment theories have not themselves investigated which electoral policies
promote these values and which do not. The scholars have drawn ably from the
relevant academic literature and historical record, but they have not carried out
their own empirical analysis. Democratic theory and quantitative inquiry seldom
mix.
However, a number of political scientists have explored the links between
electoral rules and the various kinds of responsiveness and alignment. We
summarize their findings here and critique them in the next section. For the sake
of simplicity, we organize our discussion by the category of the rule: (1)
franchise access, i.e., policies relating to the ability to vote; (2) party regulation,
i.e., policies relating to parties’ nominee selection and ballot access; (3)
campaign finance, i.e., policies relating to campaign contributions and
expenditures; (4) redistricting, i.e., policies relating to the drawing of electoral
districts; and (5) governmental structure, i.e., policies relating to the organization
of the elected branches. These categories capture essentially all of the rules that
constitute states’ electoral systems.
Starting with access to the franchise, several studies have examined the
consequences of restrictive policies for the partisan composition of the
electorate—a plausible proxy for partisan alignment.37 Photo identification laws,
for example, result in a pro-Republican swing of 0–1% because their bite is felt
(a bit) more acutely by Democratic supporters.38 Likewise, the elimination of
same-day registration produces a pro-Republican swing of about 5% because
Democrats are more likely to take advantage of the policy where it is available.39
On the other hand, the elimination of early voting produces a pro-Democratic
swing of about 5% because Republicans are more inclined to cast their ballots
ahead of election day.40 And early closing dates for voter registration and purges

37
The proxy is plausible because if a franchise restriction alters the partisan composition of the electorate,
then the median actual voter diverges from the median eligible voter who would have participated in the
absence of the restriction. See id. at 325-26.
38
See Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, NEW REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-democrats; Brad T. Gomez,
Uneven Hurdles: The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Voter Turnout 19 (April 2008); Nate
Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter Identification Laws, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 15, 2012),
http://fivethirtyeight. blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws/.
39
See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United
States, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7, 27 (2003); Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws and Partisan Gains: The Effects of
Early Voting and Same Day Registration on the Parties’ Vote Shares? 8 (2013).
40
See Burden et al., supra note 39, at 8.
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of voter rolls apparently do not skew the electorate in either party’s favor (though
they do reduce turnout).41
Second, a good deal of work has investigated whether the type of primary
that a state holds—the highest-profile category of party regulation—is connected
to the positions that politicians adopt.42 Some scholars have found that more
inclusive primaries (i.e., primaries in which more voters are allowed to
participate) benefit candidates with more moderate stances, thus potentially
boosting preference alignment.43 Other scholars, including two of us, have
concluded that primary type is largely unrelated to legislative polarization.44 In
this literature, several studies measure voters’ as well as legislators’ preferences,
typically including the former as controls in their models. 45 One noteworthy
study conducted a survey of California voters, quantified voters’ and legislators’
preferences on the same scale, and then compared the responsiveness and
alignment of the state’s House members before and after the 2012 adoption of the
top-two primary.46 The study found that the reform did not produce improvement
along either metric.47
Third, numerous studies have tested whether campaign finance regulations
influence the partisan composition of the electorate or of the legislature.48 If the

41
See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration,
Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 179, 186, 195 (1995).
Furthermore, studies have found that felon disenfranchisement laws are harmful to Democrats, though they
have not quantified the magnitude of the pro-Republican swing. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza,
Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM.
SOC. REV. 777, 786–89 (2002).
42
One study also has examined the implications of “sore loser” laws—provisions barring candidates
defeated in primaries from running again in the general election—for politicians’ policy stances. See Barry C.
Burden et al., Nominations and the Supply of Candidates: The Connection Between Sore Lower Laws and
Congressional Polarization (2013). The study found that the laws are linked to greater extremism among both
congressional candidates and representatives, and thus contribute to legislative polarization. See id. at 17-23.
43
See, e.g., Will Bullock & Joshua D. Clinton, More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the
Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior from California, 73 J. POL. 915, 923 (2011); Elisabeth R.
Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 304, 313
(1998); Kristin Kanthak & Rebecca Morton, The Effects of Electoral Rules on Congressional Primaries, in
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 116, 126 (Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds.,
2001); Christopher Westley et al., Primary Election Systems and Candidate Deviation, 30 E. ECON. J. 365, 371
(2004).
44
See, e.g., Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: Assessing California’s Top-Two Primary
and Redistricting Commission 7 (2013); McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342-47.
45
See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 314-18;
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342.
46
See Kousser et al., supra note 44. In a top-two primary, all candidates are listed on the same ballot, and
all voters may cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice (of whatever party). The two candidates with the
most votes, irrespective of party, then advance to the general election.
47
See id. at 22-23.
48
Another set of studies examine whether campaign finance regulations promote competitiveness, which
itself may be correlated with responsiveness. This work typically finds that regulations do make races somewhat
more competitive. See, e.g., Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence
from Arizona and Maine, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 274-77 (2008); David M. Primo et al., State Campaign
Finance Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE MARKETPLACE OF
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 269, 278 (Michael P. McDonald & John
Samples eds., 2006); Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition Policy for Elections: Do
Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177, 199 (2006). For a more extensive discussion of
how campaign finance regulations affect alignment, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign
Finance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42-48).
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regulations have such an effect, they may shift partisan alignment relative to a
regime of unrestricted contributions and expenditures.49 Corporate spending
bans, then, result in Democratic candidates winning 1% to 6% more seats in state
legislatures.50 Corporate contribution limits produce a pro-Democratic seat swing
of about 2% in state senates.51 Other types of contribution limits apparently have
no impact on candidates’ vote margins in gubernatorial races.52 But higher
individual contribution limits give rise to more extreme voting records by state
legislators (because individual donors themselves are quite extreme).53
Conversely, higher limits on donations by political parties54 and political action
committees (PACs)55 are linked to more centrist voting records (because parties
and PACs are relatively moderate). Higher individual limits thus may reduce
preference alignment while higher party and PAC limits may increase it.56
Fourth, a substantial literature, to which we have contributed in prior work,
examines the implications of redistricting institutions and criteria for partisan
bias and electoral responsiveness. (Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the
share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide
vote.57 Electoral responsiveness denotes the rate at which a party gains or loses
seats given changes in its statewide vote share.58) As to institutions, we have
found that California’s new commission specifically,59 and redistricting
commissions generally,60 produce declines in bias and gains in responsiveness.

49

The misalignment that may occur here is the divergence between the median actual voter and the
median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 338-39.
50
See Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending 28 (Mar. 24, 2013); Tilman Klumpp et al.,
Money Talks: The Impact of Citizens United on State Elections 9 (Sept. 2012).
51
See Besley & Case, supra note 39, at 27.
52
See DONALD A. GROSS & ROBERT K. GOIDEL, THE STATES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 81 (2003);
Primo et al., supra note 48, at 279.
53
See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State Legislatures
4, 25, 37 (Sept. 4, 2013).
54
See Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase
Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 19-20 (Jan. 8-11, 2014); Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to
Reduce
Polarization?
Give
Parties
More
Money,
WASH.
POST
(July
21,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-polarization-give-partiesmore-money/.
55
See Barber, supra note 53, at 4, 37; see also Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political
Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295-98 (2013) (also finding that PACs are relatively moderate).
56
Another group of studies investigate whether “clean money” public financing systems affect levels of
polarization. They find that these systems either have no impact or in fact are polarizing. See Andrew B. Hall,
How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 19 (Jan. 13, 2014); Jeffrey J. Harden &
Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Donors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the
American States 23-24 (May 2, 2014); Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding
Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine 9-15 (2014).
57
See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 545 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a
Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007).
58
See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 57, at 9.
59
See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens
Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. L. POL. & POL’Y 1, 22-24 (2012) (displaying seat-vote curves indicating that
commission-drawn plans are less biased and more responsive than prior plans).
60
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 669, 710-15 app. tbls.2-5 (2014) (finding that commission usage reduces efficiency differential in state
legislative elections and increases responsiveness in congressional elections); see also id. (finding that court
usage also improves both partisan fairness and responsiveness).
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Work by other scholars, analyzing both American and foreign commissions,
confirms our findings.61 As to criteria, one of us has found that compactness
worsens both bias and responsiveness,62 that respect for political subdivisions
improves responsiveness but worsens bias,63 and that respect for communities of
interest has varying effects depending on how it is measured.64 Again, work by
other scholars corroborates the mixed record of line-drawing requirements.65
Finally, a range of studies have looked into how aspects of governmental
structure, in particular the voter initiative, shape the relationship between public
opinion and actual public policy. The literature on the initiative is inconclusive,
with some studies finding that its availability makes policy more responsive to
and aligned with the public’s views,66 and other studies concluding that it has no
such impact.67 Despite their divergent results, these studies all employ similar
methodologies, using survey data to estimate public opinion and legislative
enactments to measure public policy.68 The same approach has been exploited by
a handful of very recent studies to evaluate two additional structural policies: the
presence of term limits and the professionalism of state legislatures. These
works’ findings are mixed as well, though they do hint that the policies may
improve representation.69

61
See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections
13 (Apr. 13, 2007); Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 543, 549, 552; Simon Jackman, Measuring Electoral
Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 345, 350 (1994); lan Siaroff, Electoral Bias in Quebec
Since 1936, 4 CAN. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 66–67 (2010).
62
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 710-15 app. tbls.2-5.
63
See id.
64
Compare id. (finding that respect for communities of interest has little effect on bias or responsiveness),
with Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1944-48, 1963-66 (2012) (finding
that spatial diversity, a proxy for district-community congruence, is linked to improvements in district-level
representation and plan-level bias and responsiveness).
65
See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 260-64 (2013) (finding that randomly drawn plans with
compact districts tend to favor Republicans); Richard Forgette et al., Do Redistricting Principles and Practices
Affect U.S. State Legislative Electoral Competition?, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 151, 162-63 (2009) (finding that
certain criteria increase competitiveness in state legislative races while others do not); Richard Forgette &
Glenn Platt, Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY
934, 946 (2005) (same with respect to incumbent party vote share in congressional elections).
66
See, e.g., Kevin Arcenaux, Direct Democracy and the Link Between Public Opinion and State Abortion
Policy, 2 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 372, 380-82 (2002); Barry C. Burden, Institutions and Policy Representation
in the States, 5 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 373, 384-85 (2005); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the
Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 117-24 (1996); John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of
Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 133, 145-46 (2010). Matsusaka also investigates the
influence of several of the electoral policies discussed above on outcome alignment, finding no effect in most
cases. See Matsusaka, supra, at 152-58.
67
See, e.g., Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic Representation in the American States,
1960-2012, at 23 (Aug. 24, 2014); Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Gun Behind the Door: Ballot Initiatives, State
Policies, and Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 760, 769 (1996); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 160-62; James
Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and Noninitiative
U.S. States, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 304, 312-19 (2009); Boris Shor, Congruence, Responsiveness, and
Representation in American State Legislatures 23 (Aug. 25, 2014); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher
Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government 23 (Mar. 2014).
68
The one exception is Shor, supra note 67, who studies preference alignment at the chamber level, albeit
cross-sectionally.
69
See Caughey & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 23 (finding ambiguous but somewhat positive effects); Lax
& Phillips, supra note 32, at 160-62 (finding positive effects); Shor, supra note 67, at 23 (finding no impact);
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 24 (finding no impact).
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Of course, this brief review does not exhaust the literature on electoral
policies and their consequences. But it should convey, at least in broad strokes,
the questions that scholars have sought to answer, the techniques they have used,
and the results of their investigations. In our view, the existing academic work is
impressive in many respects, but it largely fails to assess preference
responsiveness and alignment, especially with respect to electoral rules that vary
only at the state legislative level. We explicate our critique in greater detail in the
next section.
C. Limitations
The essential problem with the existing literature is that almost none of it
measures both voters’ and representatives’ preferences. It therefore gives little
help to courts and policymakers who would like to evaluate and formulate
policies based on their implications for preference responsiveness and alignment.
Take, for instance, the vast majority of franchise access and campaign finance
studies. They typically ask whether franchise restrictions or campaign finance
regulations alter the partisan makeup of the electorate or of the legislature.70 But
neither voters’ partisan choices (in most elections71) nor legislators’ partisan
affiliations are suitable proxies for policy preferences. The binary decision of
which party to vote for, or to associate with, sheds little light on the more
complex issue of political ideology.
Similarly, the concepts of electoral responsiveness and partisan bias that
preoccupy many redistricting scholars both link parties’ legislative seat shares to
their statewide vote shares.72 These metrics too are indicative of voters’ and
legislators’ partisan inclinations, but not of their policy views. They are helpful if
one is interested in partisan responsiveness or alignment, but much less relevant
if one’s concern is the relationship between voters’ and legislators’ policy
preferences.
Unlike this work, many of the party regulation studies do quantify
legislators’ policy preferences, usually in order to see whether representation is
affected by the type of primary that a state holds.73 Some of these studies also
include measures of voters’ preferences in their analyses.74 But even in this

70
See, e.g., GROSS & GOIDEL, supra note 52, at 81 (considering only voters’ partisan choices); Burden,
supra note 39, at 8 (same); Gomez, supra note 38, at 19 (same); Mitchell & Wlezien, supra note 41, at 186, 195
(same); Primo et al., supra note 48, at 279.(same); see also, e.g., Hall, supra note 50, at 28 (considering only
representatives’ partisan affiliations); Klumpp et al, supra note 50 (same).
71
As we discuss below, voters’ partisan choices in presidential elections actually are quite good proxies
for their political ideologies. See infra Section II.A.
72
See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 61, at 13 (using bias and responsiveness to analyze redistricting issues);
Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 543, 549, 552 (same); Jackman, supra note 61, at 345, 350 (same); Kogan &
McGhee, supra note 59, at 22-24 (same); Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 710-15 app. tbls.2-5 (same).
73
See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 921 (using roll call voting data to quantify
representatives’ preferences); Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 313-14 (using interest group ratings to do so);
Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 7 (using candidate survey data to do so); McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 341-42
(also using roll call voting data); Westley, supra note 43, at 369 (also using interest group ratings).
74
See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 314-18;
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342.
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literature, preference responsiveness and alignment almost never are examined
directly. At best, voters’ preferences are treated as controls in the models; they
are not actually used to estimate the democratic values that are of interest to us.75
As far as we know, only a single study in this area has calculated responsiveness
and alignment explicitly, and even this study was limited to a single state’s
reform of its primary system.76
Lastly, the governmental structure scholarship explores how public opinion
is connected to actual policy outcomes, not to legislators’ policy preferences.77
The scholarship gauges voters’ policy preferences using opinion surveys, but it
does not apply the same approach to elected officials.78 Instead, it looks to
statutory compilations and other official sources to determine which policies in
fact have been enacted by the elected branches. As a result, the studies in this
field are able to measure outcome responsiveness and alignment, but not
preference responsiveness and alignment.79
The other weakness we perceive in the existing literature is that most of it
assesses electoral rules in congressional (or even higher-level) elections. Very
little of it aims to ascertain the rules’ implications at the state legislative level,
even though this is where the greatest policy variation and the largest number of
constituencies can be found. For example, we are not aware of a single franchise
access or governmental structure study that carries out its analysis at the state
legislative level. Instead, these studies tend to investigate the effects of franchise
restrictions and structural factors, respectively, in statewide elections and on
statewide policy.80 Likewise, two of us have conducted the only study to date on
the impact of primary type on state legislators’ policy positions.81 All of the other
work in this domain has examined the link between primary type and U.S. House
members’ views.82 The scholarship on redistricting is dominated by
congressional studies as well. Our own contributions are among the very few
studies that have scrutinized line-drawing institutions and criteria at the state
legislative level.83
The lone exception to our critique is the campaign finance literature, a good
deal of which evaluates the effects of campaign finance regulations in state

75

See id.
See Kousser et al., supra note 44; cf. Westley, supra note 43, at 369-70 (using residuals from regression
of interest group ratings on district characteristics as proxy for preference alignment).
77
See, e.g., Arcenaux, supra note 66, at 378 (examining state abortion policies); Burden, supra note 66, at
380 (examining state abortion and death penalty policies); Gerber, supra note 66, at 112-13 (examining state
abortion policies); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 150-51 (examining array of state policies); Matsusaka,
supra note 66, at 139-41 (same); Monogan et al., supra note 67, at 310 (examining overall state policy
liberalism).
78
See id.
79
The one exception is again Shor, supra note 67, who studies preference alignment at the chamber level
cross-sectionally.
80
See supra notes 38-41, 66-69 (discussing these studies).
81
See McGhee et al., supra note 7.
82
See supra notes 42-47 (discussing these studies).
83
See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 59, at 16-25; Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 679-86; cf., e.g.,
Cain et al., supra note 61, at 7-11; Forgette et al., supra note 65, at 158-61.
76
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legislative elections.84 At the congressional level, the rules on campaign
contributions and expenditures are set by federal law, meaning that there is no
state-by-state variation whatsoever. The geographic divergences that allow
meaningful conclusions to be drawn exist only at the state legislative level, and
accordingly that is where several studies in this area have cast their attention.85
Our assessment of the literature raises two related questions: First, why have
existing studies not sought to measure preference responsiveness and alignment,
especially at the state legislative level? And second, are preference
responsiveness and alignment even worth measuring, given the literature’s
manifest lack of interest in them? As to the first question, there likely are two
reasons why the literature has not exhausted our subject of inquiry already. The
first is that preference responsiveness and alignment were not defined clearly
until relatively recently. For decades, political scientists focused on
responsiveness alone, typically by calculating the correlation between some
measure of public opinion and some metric of legislators’ policy views.86 The
point that responsiveness refers to the rate of change of legislators’ preferences
given some shift in voters’ preferences, while alignment denotes the congruence
of voters’ and legislators’ preferences, was not grasped fully until the last decade
or so.87 Indeed, prominent law professors and political scientists continue to
confuse the two concepts on occasion.88
The second reason why preference responsiveness and alignment have not
been analyzed thoroughly, at least at the state legislative level, is that the
necessary data for such analysis previously did not exist.89 At the congressional
level, interest groups such as Americans for Democratic Action and the
American Conservative Union have issued ratings of legislators’ voting records
for decades,90 and in the 1980s, political scientists devised a technique for

84

See, e.g., Barber, supra note 53, at 8-9; Hall, supra note 56, at 6-7; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 54,
at 6-7; Malhotra, supra note 48, at 269-71; Primo et al., supra note 48, at 274-77; Stratmann & AparicioCastillo, supra note 48, at 184-86.
85
See id.
86
See, e.g., Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 149 (noting that while “[t]he existing literature establishes a
high degree of responsiveness to ideology,” “it cannot usually answer questions about congruence”);
Matsusaka, supra note 66, at 136 (referring to “the conventional ‘correlation’ approach that uses preference
proxies to measure responsiveness”); Shor, supra note 32, at 2 (explaining how methodological issues have
“long bedeviled attempts to assess congruence at the state level,” “so analysts have typically had to fall back on
responsiveness as a benchmark”).
87
Some of the studies that make this point most clearly are Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 148; and
Shor, supra note 32, at 2. See also supra note 32 (discussing these studies).
88
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 165 (2003) (conflating
“responsiveness to public opinion” with “align[ing] the behavior of politicians and officials with the people’s
interests”); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI.
136, 138 (2001) (using “responsiveness” and “congruence” interchangeably and referring to them as same
“idea”); cf. John G. Matsusaka, Problems with a Methodology Used to Evaluate the Voter Initiative, 63 J. POL.
1250, 1250-54 (2001) (criticizing several political scientists for confusing responsiveness and alignment).
89
See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337 (“In the past, state politics scholars have been
hindered by the unavailability of data on policy preferences at the level of state legislative districts.”).
90
See ACU Ratings, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION, http://www.conservative.org/legislative-ratings
(last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Voting Records, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION,
http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
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converting roll call voting data into ideological ideal points.91 Information on
voters’ preferences in congressional districts also has long been available in the
form of aggregated presidential election results92 and public opinion polling.93 At
the state legislative level, on the other hand, the earliest ideal point estimates
were generated in 2002,94 and reasonably complete estimates, based on roll call
voting data from all ninety-nine state legislative chambers, were not released
until 2011.95 Similarly, it was not until 2013 that either aggregated presidential
election results or estimates of voters’ ideologies became available for most state
legislative districts.96 And a unified database of all the electoral policies that
shape states’ political systems—and that might be linked in some way to
preference responsiveness and alignment—has never before been assembled.
As for the second question, whether preference responsiveness and alignment
are worth investigating in the first place, we believe they occupy a sort of sweet
spot in the study of representation. Partisan responsiveness and alignment
undoubtedly are important, but even when they are achieved, the relationship
between voter and representative may remain gravely flawed. Assume, for
instance, that in one election the median voter in a district is a Democrat and so is
the candidate elected, and that in the next election the median voter and the
winning candidate both are Republicans. Assume also that after the first election
the politician’s voting record is far more liberal than the median voter would like,
and that after the second it is far more conservative.97 Then we have partisan
responsiveness and alignment—since the legislator’s partisan affiliation is
responsive to and congruent with the median voter’s partisan preference—but we
have a troubling lack of policy representation as well. After neither election does
the legislator even remotely share the median voter’s policy views.
Conversely, outcome responsiveness and alignment are significant too, but
they strike us as overly ambitious goals for electoral rules to accomplish on their

91
See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole & Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S.
Congress, 1959-80, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373 (1985).
92
Every four years, the Cook Political Report publishes its partisan voter index (PVI), which “measures
how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as a whole.” Partisan Voter Index,
COOK POLITICAL REPORT, http://cookpolitical.com/story/5604 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). Political scientist
Gary Jacobson also maintains a database of presidential election results aggregated by congressional district
from 1946 to the present. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 679 n.40 (discussing this database).
93
See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th
House, 68 J. POL. 397 (2006); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1963); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, Congressional Voting by Spatial Reasoning,
2000-2010 (Oct. 11, 2012).
94
See John H. Aldrich & James S. Coleman Battista, Conditional Party Government in the States, 46 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 164 (2002).
95
See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8; see also Bonica, supra note 9 (estimating state legislators’
ideologies based on the identities of their campaign donors); cf. Barber, supra note 53, at 8 (“Until recently, no
data existed to measure the ideology of state legislators over time.”).
96
See McGhee et al., supra note 7; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6.
97
This is a very plausible scenario in contemporary America—indeed it seems to be the norm. See, e.g.,
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEG.
STUD. Q. 533, 541 (2001) (showing that distribution of legislators’ roll-call votes is far more bimodal than
distribution of constituents’ opinions); Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 528
(2010) (same).
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own. The policies that actually are enacted by the elected branches indeed are the
product, in part, of the rules that govern the electoral system. But they also are
the product of myriad factors that are beyond the scope of these rules: politicians’
own interests and agendas, partisan pressures inside and outside the legislature,
legislative structures and voting rules, relations between the legislative and
executive branches, and so forth.98 Given all of these factors, we think it is
unrealistic to expect electoral rules to bring about outcome responsiveness and
alignment by themselves. For the same reason, we think scholars who are
interested in the effects of these rules would do well to broaden their inquiries to
other, more attainable types of representation.
If partisan representation is not a demanding enough criterion, and outcome
representation is too demanding, then preference representation seems just right
to us. It recognizes that a democracy is not functioning well merely because
legislators’ partisan affiliations and voters’ partisan preferences are linked. But it
also does not ask of electoral rules more than they plausibly can deliver. Its more
modest aim is simply to connect voters’ and legislators’ policy preferences, thus
directly improving the quality of representation and indirectly increasing the
likelihood of responsive and aligned policy outcomes. This is a valuable goal, in
our view, and one that is well worth further exploration despite its neglect by the
existing literature.99 We therefore devote the rest of this Article to our empirical
analysis of electoral policies’ effects on preference responsiveness and
alignment.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our analysis begins with a description of the data we use. Most of our
information on voters’ preferences, legislators’ preferences, and states’ electoral
policies either has become available very recently, or has never been available
until now. Next, we explain our methodology for calculating responsiveness and
alignment. We estimate responsiveness (at the chamber level) by regressing the
change in the median legislator’s preferences from one period to the next on the
change in the median voter’s preferences. We estimate alignment (at both the
district and chamber levels) by modeling legislators’ preferences as a function of
their constituents’ preferences, and then computing the resulting regression
residuals. These residuals capture the gap between the representation that would
correspond to voters’ views and the representation the voters actually receive.
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See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 360-65 (discussing these factors at length).
For a selection of scholars who also have recognized the importance of preference responsiveness and
alignment, see G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND
PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000) (“In contemporary democracies elections are supposed to establish connections
that compel or greatly encourage the policymakers to do what the citizens want.”); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking
Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 526 (2003) (arguing that “constituent-representative congruence . . .
. is a factor in each of the forms of representation”); and Michael D. McDonald et al., What Are Elections For?
Conferring the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2004) (“To be truly democratic, the rules for
[elections] should empower the voter median by ensuring that it is also the policy position of the
[representative].”).
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Our findings on the effects of different electoral policies can be summarized
most easily by issue area. First, among franchise access rules, identification
requirements have little impact while early voting improves alignment. Second,
among party regulations, sore loser laws are aligning while certain types of open
primaries worsen alignment and responsiveness. Third, among campaign finance
reforms, limits on individual contributions are aligning while public financing
schemes are misaligning. Fourth, among redistricting policies, independent
commission usage is aligning, while the effects of traditional line-drawing
criteria vary by electoral level. And fifth, among variants of governmental
structure, term limits are misaligning. There are other significant results in the
models as well, but these are the most robust, in our view.
Lastly, we perform a series of robustness checks to ensure that our findings
are reliable. Specifically, we rerun our models using an alternative measure of
responsiveness; omit states for which our estimates of presidential election
results by state legislative district are less accurate; collapse our electoral policies
into a much smaller number of categories; and replicate another political
scientist’s analysis of how chamber-level alignment is affected by a number of
reforms. On the whole, these checks strongly corroborate our results.
A. Data Sources
We noted earlier that data on voters’ preferences, legislators’ preferences,
and electoral policies at the state legislative district level previously did not
exist.100 This data now does exist, thanks to both our own efforts and those of
other scholars, and it forms the foundation of this project. First, with respect to
voters’ preferences, political scientists Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher
Warshaw recently merged nine nationwide surveys, all carried out between 2004
and 2011, with a total of 275,000 respondents.101 They then carried out a cuttingedge statistical procedure known as multi-level regression and post-stratification,
which enables accurate public opinion estimates to be generated even for
relatively small populations.102 State legislative districts are among the
geographic units for which Tausanovitch and Warshaw produced estimates of
citizens’ policy preferences.103 These estimates would be ideal for our purposes
were it not for the fact that they are available only for a single point in time (the
entire 2004–2011 period).
Because of this limitation, we also collected presidential election results
aggregated by state legislative district, which do vary temporally. Presidential
election results are widely considered an excellent proxy for voters’ policy
preferences because they too are the product of voters’ underlying ideological
views. In an article on the measurement of district-level public opinion, for
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See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332.
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See id. at 333-36; see also Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in
the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 109-10 (2009) (describing this technique in more detail).
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See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337-39 (using these estimates to analyze representation
in state legislatures).
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instance, Warshaw and Jonathan Rodden observe that “[e]mpirical researchers in
need of a catchall one-dimensional proxy for district ideology have typically
turned to the district-level presidential vote.”104 Similarly, the correlation
between Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s public opinion estimates and 2008
presidential vote shares is higher than 0.9 at the state level.105 We therefore feel
comfortable using presidential data as our principal measure of voters’
preferences (though we also run certain models using Tausanovitch and
Warshaw’s estimates).
In prior work, one of us assembled presidential election results aggregated by
state legislative district for 2000, 2004, and 2008.106 A group of Daily Kos
analysts gathered this data for 2012.107 For 1992 and 1996, lastly, we submitted
freedom of information requests to all fifty states, thereby obtaining the requisite
results for several jurisdictions. For states that were unable to produce the data,
we used county-level presidential election results to estimate the results by state
legislative district.108 This procedure has been found to be quite accurate,
especially for states with large numbers of counties, and thus is a reasonable
alternative when the actual data is unavailable.109 Our resulting database of
presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district is by far the
most comprehensive of its kind.
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Christopher Warshaw & Jonathan Rodden, How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on
Individual Issues?, 74 J. POL. 203, 211 (2012). For examples of political scientists using district-level
presidential vote shares as a proxy for voters’ policy preferences, see Ansolabehere et al., supra note 97, at 540;
Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members‘ Voting,
96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 131 (2002); Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda
to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Legislative Representation, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 3 (2011); and McGhee et al.,
supra note 7, at 342. But see Georgia Kernell, Giving Order to Districts: Estimating Voter Distributions with
National Election Returns, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 215, 216-19 (2009) (noting that unless districts’ ideological
variances are equal, presidential vote shares may be misleading). To the extent the presidential vote is a noisy
proxy for actual district ideology, our coefficient estimates are biased downward, and any findings that do attain
statistical significance are more credible.
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See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 335; see also Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 11
(finding correlation as high as 0.94 between estimates of district ideology and presidential vote shares); Masket
& Noel, supra note 104, at 14 (also finding correlation above 0.9).
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This was Rogers. See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342 (using this data). This dataset is
comprehensive except that it is missing Gore-Bush figures for the New Mexico Senate and the Arkansas,
Colorado, and Mississippi state legislatures; and Kerry-Bush figures for the Florida and Mississippi state
legislatures.
107
See Daily Kos Elections' 2012 Election Results by Congressional and Legislative Districts, DAILY KOS
(July 9, 2013), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/09/1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-electionresults-by-congressional-and-legislative-districts.
108
More specifically, we disaggregated the county-level data to the Census block group level on the basis
of counties’ and block groups’ adult populations. We then aggregated back up to state legislative districts using
district maps made available by the Census to determine which block groups are located in which districts. See
Cartographic Boundary Files - State Legislative Districts - Upper and Lower, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_sld.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). This is the same
procedure that other political scientists have employed as well. See Carl Eoin Klarner & C. Lockwood
Reynolds, Using County Data to Estimate State Legislative District Characteristics; Shor & McCarty, supra
note 8, at 543.
109
See Klarner & Reynolds, supra note 108, at fig.1 (showing that correlation between estimated and
actual presidential election results is higher than 0.7 for most states’ legislative districts); Shor & McCarty,
supra note 8, at 543 (finding correlation above 0.8 for Texas state legislative districts’ estimated and actual
presidential election results).
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Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, political scientists Boris
Shor and Nolan McCarty recently compiled roll call voting data for all ninetynine state legislative chambers from 1993 to 2013.110 They then merged this data
with candidates’ responses to a policy survey administered by Project Vote Smart
over the last two decades.111 In combination, these two datasets enabled Shor and
McCarty to calculate ideal points for all state legislators who served during the
relevant timeframe.112 These ideal points serve as our core measure of legislators’
policy positions. They capture, on a single left-right axis, the ideologies of
legislators in all states over nearly two decades.
Unfortunately, the Shor and McCarty scores do not vary over time. As they
acknowledge, “Because we bridge legislatures over time by estimating a single
ideal point for each legislator, we do not allow for ideological drift by
individuals.”113 However, the invariant nature of these scores is not overly
worrisome since legislators usually maintain consistent positions over time114 and
representation still may shift via replacement.115 As detailed below, we also take
into account the scores’ invariability by including only newly elected legislators
in our district-level analyses. That way each legislator (with each fixed ideal
point) appears only once in our models.116
We note as well that we considered using the ideal points that Adam Bonica
recently generated using the identities of candidates’ campaign donors.117 These
ideal points do vary over time as candidates’ donor bases shift.118 But because of
the relatively small number of people who give to each state legislative
candidate, the estimates are not very reliable at this low electoral level. They can
distinguish crudely between liberal and conservative candidates, but, unlike the
Shor and McCarty scores, they do not enable more fine-grained distinctions
between types of liberalism and conservatism.119 Accordingly, despite their
appealing temporal dynamism, we do not further employ the Bonica ideal points
in this Article.
Our final category of data is information about states’ electoral policies over
the 1992–2012 period. How these policies influence responsiveness and
alignment, of course, is the key question we seek to answer in this Article. We
consulted a wide range of primary and secondary sources to ascertain which
states implemented which policies at which times. As in our earlier review of the
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See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 533; see also Data, MEASURING AMERICAN LEGISLATURES (July
2014), http://americanlegislatures.com/data/ (containing most recent update to Shor and McCarty scores).
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See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 532-33.
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See id. at 533-37.
113
Id. at 533.
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See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 526; Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131
PUBLIC CHOICE 435, 435 (2007) (presenting evidence that “members of Congress die in their ideological boots,”
that is, “adopt an ideological position and maintain that position throughout their careers”).
115
Since Shor and McCarty calculate separate ideal points for each legislator, if a given politician is
replaced by another, then representation indeed may shift at the district level.
116
See infra Section II.B.
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See Bonica, supra note 9, at 5-9.
118
See id. at 13-15.
119
See id. at 24 (noting correlations of only about 0.6 between Shor and McCarty and Bonica estimates of
parties’ median legislators’ ideal points in state legislatures).
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literature, we sorted the policies into five groups: (1) franchise access; (2) party
regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4) redistricting; and (5) governmental
structure.120 Below we provide information on the policies we coded within each
group as well as the sources we relied upon to do so. It is worth noting again that
no electoral policy database as extensive as ours has been assembled
previously.121


Franchise access: requirements to show non-photo identification before
voting; requirements to show photo identification before voting;
requirements to prove citizenship before registering to vote; availability of
early voting; availability of same-day voter registration; and felon
disenfranchisement rules.122



Party regulation: type of party primary (open, semi-open, closed, semiclosed, or nonpartisan); and “sore loser” laws banning candidates defeated in
primaries from running again in general election.123



Campaign finance: individual contribution limits; corporate contribution
limits; union contribution limits; PAC contribution limits; corporate spending
bans; union spending bans; and public financing.124



Redistricting: criteria used for redistricting (compactness, respect for
political subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, respect for prior
district cores, and/or incumbency protection); and institution responsible for
redistricting (unified government, divided government, commission, or
court).125
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See supra Section I.B.
The most similar databases previously assembled are by Besley & Case, supra note 39, and Matsusaka,
supra note 66.
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The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) provides data on most of these policies. See
Absentee and Early Voting, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-earlyvoting.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Same Day Voter Registration, NCSL (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx;
Voter
Identification
Requirements, NCSL (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. The
best source for early voting rules is Non-Precinct Place Voting, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 2, 2010),
http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/non-precinct-place-voting-85899378759. The best source for felon
disenfranchisement rules is NICOLE D. PORTER, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
REFORM, 1997-2010 (2010). We supplemented all of our sources for this project by consulting archived
versions of online materials as well as current and prior compilations of state laws.
123
For data on primary type, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339-41. For data on sore loser laws, see
Burden et al, supra note 42, at 34.
124
NCSL is the best source for campaign finance laws in effect in recent years. See Contribution Limits –
An Overview, NCSL (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaigncontribution-limits-overview.aspx; Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NCSL (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx.
The
Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the best source for earlier years. See, e.g., FEC, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAW 2002: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK RESEARCH CHARTS (2002),
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02.shtml. For data on expenditure limits in particular, see
Klumpp et al, supra note 50, at 16.
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Stephanopoulos has coded these redistricting policies in prior work. See Stephanopoulos, supra note
60, at 690 n.90. NCSL again is the best secondary source for these policies. See NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW
121
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Governmental structure: availability of voter initiative; availability of
legislator recall; presence of legislative term limits; and level of legislative
professionalism.126
B. Methodology

In combination, our three categories of data—on voters’ preferences,
legislators’ preferences, and electoral policies—allow us to estimate the effects
of different reforms on alignment and responsiveness. The first two types of data
enable the calculation of alignment and responsiveness at the district and
chamber levels. Once these concepts have been quantified, the third kind of data
makes possible assessments of actual policy impact. Below we explain in more
detail our strategies for measuring alignment and responsiveness and then
investigating causality.
Both alignment and responsiveness, again, refer to certain relationships
between voters’ preferences and legislators’ preferences.127 Alignment denotes
the congruence of these preferences, while responsiveness captures the rate of
change of legislator ideology given a shift in constituent ideology.128 But while
these definitions are clear in the abstract, complexities arise when voters’ and
legislators’ preferences are gauged using different techniques. After all, who is to
say what the relationship should be between voting record (our metric of
legislator ideology) and the presidential vote (our usual metric of constituent
ideology)? Theories of representation suggest there should be some connection,
but they do not specify how strong this link should be. Notably, voters may
expect different behavior from their state legislator than from their president, and
may cast ballots based on different criteria in races for each office, thus rendering
our metrics only weakly related.
In all of the models we run, we respond to this concern by focusing on
relative rather than absolute levels of alignment and responsiveness. Even though
we may not know the ideal relationship between voting record and the
presidential vote, we still may draw conclusions based on how this relationship

2010, at 125-27, 189-96, 201-53 (2009); NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000 (1999), available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/red-tc.htm. For useful data on the 2000 and
2010 cycles, see ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). For useful
data on the 1990 cycle, see Action on Redistricting Plans: 1991-99, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2003),
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/Redsum/Action1990.htm.
126
Voter initiative data is available at Initiative and Referendum States, NCSL (Sept. 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx. Term limits data is
available at The Term Limited States, NCSL (Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-statelegislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx. Recall data is available at Recall of State Officials, NCSL (Sept.
11, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx. Peverill Squire
has quantified legislative professionalism using criteria such as salary and benefits, time demands of service,
and staff and resources. See PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES: COLONIES,
TERRITORIES, AND STATES (2012); Peverill Squire, Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire
Index Revisited, 7 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 211, 213, 220-21 (2007).
127
We are referring here (as throughout this Part and the next) to preference alignment and
responsiveness, and not their other variants.
128
See supra Section I.A.
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changes after reforms are enacted.129 For instance, if alignment increases after a
given policy is introduced (even with all the necessary controls included), then
we may surmise that the policy improves representation despite our lack of
certainty about the optimal level of alignment. Furthermore, when we calculate
alignment and responsiveness, we incorporate our divergent metrics of voters’
and legislators’ preferences as follows.
First, for alignment at the district level, we begin by regressing legislator
ideology (captured by the Shor and McCarty scores) on voter ideology (captured
by the presidential vote or the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores). We consider
only state house members in our models, because the staggered terms of many
state senates make them more difficult to analyze. We also consider only newly
elected legislators because otherwise, thanks to the static nature of the Shor and
McCarty scores, incumbents would be included multiple times but always with
the same ideal points.
This analysis reveals the overall relationship between voters’ and legislators’
preferences. In other words, it indicates how a typical legislator would vote given
the ideological views of her constituents. Once this relationship has been
determined, the computation of alignment is straightforward. All we have to do is
compare a legislator’s expected ideal point (given her voters’ preferences) with
her actual ideal point. The difference between these two figures is known as a
regression residual—and the smaller it is, the more closely aligned a legislator is
with her constituents.
It would be preferable, of course, if our metrics of voters’ and legislators’
preferences used the same scale. Then they could be compared directly, without
any need to consider regression residuals. But only voters’ and legislators’
current preferences can be placed on the same axis (by surveying voters about
issues that their legislators already have addressed through their roll call votes or
through polls of their own).130 Voters and legislators’ past preferences cannot be
standardized since the necessary voter surveys simply were not conducted.
Accordingly, we have no choice but to use our residual technique to measure
alignment. Fortunately, this technique has been employed previously by
numerous scholars and is accepted widely in the field.131 It also produces very
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See John D. Griffin, Party Polarization and Representation 10 (2013) (noting that in studies that
“focus[] on relative representation over time,” various kinds of measurement error “will not affect our
inferences”).
130
For examples of studies using voter surveys to place voters’ and representatives’ current preferences on
the same scale, see Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 523-25, Cheryl Boudreau et al., Legal Interventions in
the Market for Political Information: Lessons from Survey Experiments in Local Elections 19-21 (2013),
Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 64-68 (2009),
Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 7, and Shor & Rogowski, supra note 93, at 6-14.
131
See, e.g., Jon R. Bond et al., Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections, 47 J. POL. 510,
519-20 (1985); David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary
Electorate?, 32 LEG. STUD. Q. 79, 84 (2007); Daniel M. Butler, Discounting Disagreement: Experimental
Evidence on How Legislators’ Rationalizations Contribute to Polarization 16 (2013); Westley et al., supra note
43, at 369-70. But see Matsusaka, supra note 88, at 1250-56 (noting that this method makes a potentially
inappropriate assumption as to the linear relationship between legislator and district ideology).
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similar results to the direct comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences
when they are available on the same scale.132
Second, we calculate alignment at the chamber level—that is, how closely
aligned the median legislator is with the median voter in the state—through a
variant of the above procedure.133 But this time the basic units of our analysis are
not individual districts but rather chambers in their entirety. We also consider all
legislators here, not just newly elected ones, because our aim is to identify the
median of the body as a whole. We thus regress the median legislator ideal point
on the statewide presidential vote to determine the overall relationship between
voter and legislator ideology at the chamber level. We then compare the expected
median legislator ideal point with the actual median legislator ideal point to
ascertain the level of alignment for each body. Again, the smaller the gap
between the expected and actual ideal points, the better the chamber’s alignment,
and vice versa.134
Lastly, the invariancy of the Shor and McCarty scores means that we cannot
calculate responsiveness at the district level. Responsiveness refers to the change
in legislator ideology given a shift in voter ideology, but all of the legislators in
our database have the same ideal points throughout their careers. Fortunately, this
difficulty does not apply to the analysis of responsiveness at the chamber level.135
At this level, the ideal point of the median legislator does vary over time—due to
retirements, reelection losses, and redistricting—meaning that shifts are possible
in our metrics for both voters’ and legislators’ preferences. We thus assess
responsiveness by regressing the change in the median legislator ideal point from
one year to another on the change in the statewide presidential vote over the same
period.136 And because presidential elections take place only every four years, we
use only voters’ preferences in those years and legislators’ preferences in the
immediately subsequent years.137
To make our methodology easier to grasp, Figure 1 shows graphically how
we calculate alignment and responsiveness. The first chart displays legislator
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Using a range of datasets in which voters’ and legislators’ preferences were on the same scale, we
obtained very high correlations (typically above 0.85) between the regression residuals and the congruence
scores produced by subtracting the voters’ preferences from the legislators’ preferences. However, since the
relationship is not perfect, our residual technique does introduce some additional noise compared to the direct
comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences.
133
For one of the few studies to examine state-level alignment, see Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at
534-38.
134
Because this method uses all legislators in each chamber (with their static ideal points), it is biased
against finding effects for electoral policies. Any effects we do find thus are more credible.
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At the chamber level, one can conceive of both temporal responsiveness (the kind we study) and
spatial responsiveness, i.e., the extent to which legislator ideal points change as one moves geographically from
less to more conservative districts. See John D. Griffin, Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness:
A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis, 68 J. POL. 911, 913-14 (2006) (distinguishing between “cross-district”
and “within-district” responsiveness). We focus on temporal responsiveness because it better captures the value
that Issacharoff and Pildes laud in their work. See supra Section I.A.
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This approach allows us to estimate responsiveness for subsets of our data as well. We simply include
in the model only the states or years in which we are interested.
137
This approach necessarily limits our data substantially. Also, as with chamber-level alignment, by
including all legislators in our analysis, we bias it toward null results, and so increase our confidence in any
non-null results. See supra note 134.
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ideal point versus the district-level presidential vote for a random sampling of
districts in our database, with a best fit line indicating the overall relationship
between the variables.138 Our measure of district-level alignment is simply the
vertical distance between each legislator’s ideal point and the best fit line.
Analogously, the second chart illustrates median legislator ideal point versus the
state-level presidential vote for all chambers in our database, with a best fit line
included as well.139 Our measure of chamber-level alignment is the vertical
distance between each median legislator’s ideal point and the best fit line. And
the third chart depicts the change in median legislator ideal point from one year
to another versus the change in the state-level presidential vote over the same
period, again with a best fit line. Our measure of chamber-level responsiveness is
the coefficient that results when the first shift is regressed on the second.140
With our estimates of alignment and responsiveness in hand, we turn to the
second stage of our analysis: determining how the metrics are affected by
different electoral policies. We divide the policies into the same five categories
as before—(1) franchise access; (2) party regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4)
redistricting; and (5) governmental structure—though we also assess all of the
policies in unison after concluding our more fine-grained examination. For each
category, we carry out four OLS regressions: two for district-level alignment
(one for Democrats and one for Republicans), a third for chamber-level
alignment, and a fourth for chamber-level responsiveness.
With respect to alignment, all of our models use the absolute value of the
regression residual as the dependent variable.141 This strategy ensures that
deviations in both a liberal and a conservative direction are treated analogously.
All of our models also include the relevant policies as the key independent
variables. And we consider Democrats and Republicans separately in our districtlevel models to allow for the possibility of partisan differences in representation.
With respect to responsiveness, the change in the median legislator’s ideal point
is the dependent variable, and the key independent variables are the interactions
of the policies with the change in the statewide presidential vote. The resulting
interaction terms capture the policies’ effects on the sensitivity of the median
legislator’s ideal point to shifts in the statewide presidential vote. That is, the
terms capture chamber-level responsiveness itself.142
It also is important to note that each model includes fixed effects for years
and states. These fixed effects mean that each model features a full “difference-
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As noted earlier, this chart includes only newly elected legislators. It also includes a random sampling
of districts, rather than all districts, for ease of presentation. For a similar chart using only 2004 data (and
imputed rather than actual presidential vote shares), see Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 543.
139
As also noted earlier, the median ideal points are computed using all legislators’ scores. For similar
charts using 2000, 2004, and 2008 data, see id. at 544.
140
And as noted earlier as well, we calculate responsiveness using only voters’ preferences in presidential
election years and legislators’ preferences in the following years.
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Because the Shor/McCarty scores range from -3 to 3, the absolute values of the regression residuals
theoretically may vary from 0 to 6, as may the treatment effects of the various policies we examine. In practice,
the largest treatment effects are on the order of -0.5 or 0.5.
142
For examples of other scholars using very similar modeling strategies to study responsiveness, see
Griffin, supra note 135, at 916, and Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 20.
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in-differences” design. The coefficient for each policy thus indicates the impact
of the reform relative to both the state’s own prior history and developments in
other states. This design controls for any time trends as well as any fixed
differences among states due to politics, economics, demography, culture, or
other factors. The design also capitalizes on the remarkable temporal and
geographic variation of the policies in our database. It therefore brings us closer
to the social scientific ideal of identifying the true causal effect of reform.143

143
For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at
343. Fixed effects are more appropriate here than random effects because the relevant clusters (years and states)
are “of intrinsic interest,” and not merely “examples of possible clusters.” SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS
SKRONDAL, I MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA 97 (3d ed. 2012). Fixed effects also
are a more rigorous test than random effects, and so less likely to give rise to statistically significant findings.
We make our analysis more rigorous still by clustering standard errors in our models.
Despite our best efforts, of course, we cannot be as sure of causality as we would like. It is possible, for
instance, that the effect we attribute to a particular policy change actually is due to a simultaneous change in a
state’s culture. We therefore encourage policymakers to carry out experiments that allow more robust
conclusions to be drawn, such as implementing policies in some randomly chosen districts but not others, and
then observing whether there are differences in representational outcomes.
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FIGURE 1: LEGISLATOR IDEOLOGY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
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C. Results
We next present the results of our analysis. We begin with some summary
statistics about alignment and responsiveness across the states and over time.
These statistics provide a wealth of information about state legislative
representation in contemporary America. We then proceed to our five electoral
policy categories. For each category, we lay out hypotheses drawn from the
existing literature about the effects of different reforms, describe the results of
our models, and comment on their implications for the hypotheses. We conclude
with a series of more comprehensive models that incorporate (almost) all of the
policies in our database. These models capture the consequences of states’
electoral regulatory environments in their (near) entirety.
1. Summary Statistics
Starting with district-level alignment, Figure 2’s first chart shows the
alignment of Democratic and Republican legislators in each state over the entire
time period of our analysis.144 The closer a state is located to the chart’s origin,
the more aligned its legislators tend to be with their constituents, and vice versa.
One notable point is that just about every state’s legislators are quite misaligned.
No state’s legislators are, on average, particularly near the origin. A second
insight is that both Democrats and Republicans typically are misaligned in the
direction of the ideological extremes. That is, Democrats tend to be too liberal for
their constituents and Republicans tend to be too conservative. There is very little
misalignment toward the ideological center.145
Third, the parties’ misalignment is not symmetric. There are several states in
which the average Democrat is almost perfectly aligned (e.g., Delaware, Georgia,
Maryland, Oklahoma), and several in which she is extraordinarily misaligned
(e.g., Arizona, California, Idaho, Wyoming). In contrast, the misalignment of the
mean Republican varies much less. There are only a handful of states in which
she is highly aligned (e.g., New York) or misaligned (e.g., California). Fourth,
there seems to be a strong relationship between legislative polarization (which
does not involve voters’ views) and misalignment (which does). States such as
Arizona and California have very high levels of both polarization and
misalignment, while states such as Delaware and Rhode Island score much better

144
To generate these state estimates, as well as the year estimates in Figure 2’s second chart, we regressed
the real (as opposed to absolute) residuals on fixed-effect variables for states and years, separately for
Democrats and Republicans. The predicted values from these regressions are displayed in the charts. This
procedure helps account for changes in the composition of the sample, as not every state is represented in every
year. For the state estimates, we generated predicted values for 2008, the last year in which virtually all states
were present in the data. For the year estimates, we averaged all of the relevant state fixed-effects coefficients.
145
This finding is consistent with other studies of alignment. See, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at
528 (“What is most striking . . . is the extremism of members of the U.S. House as compared to state median
voters . . . .”); Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 40 (finding that members of U.S. House from California almost
universally are more extreme than median voter in their districts).
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on both metrics.146 This suggests that legislative polarization is the product not of
a polarized electorate, but rather of legislators who diverge from their more
centrist constituents.147
Figure 2’s second chart displays the trends in mean district-level alignment
from 1992 to 2010.148 From 1992 to 2006, the alignment of Democratic and
Republican legislators was roughly constant and about equal in magnitude.
During this period, there was no particular asymmetry in alignment, nor any
major fluctuations in its levels. But from 2006 to 2010, Republican legislators
became notably more misaligned with their constituents, while Democratic
legislators became somewhat more aligned. Unlike in the past, there now is a
clear partisan asymmetry in alignment, with Democratic legislators more
accurately reflecting voters’ preferences than their Republican counterparts.149
Turning to alignment at the collective level, Figure 3’s first chart indicates its
values for all states and over all available years. The distribution is surprisingly
balanced; there are almost exactly as many states where the median legislator is
too liberal for the median voter as there are where she is too conservative.
Another intriguing pattern is the tendency of states governed by Democrats to
have overly liberal median legislators (e.g., California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts), and of Republican-run states to have overly conservative median
members (e.g., Michigan, Missouri, Ohio). It is possible that a party’s control of
the legislature is associated with a sort of over-reaction, in which the median
member veers further in the party’s direction than the median voter would like.150
The distribution for chamber-level responsiveness, depicted in Figure 3’s
second chart, is not as symmetric. In general, the median legislator is either
moderately sensitive to changes in the statewide presidential vote (in the states on
the right side of the chart) or largely insensitive (in the states on the center-left).
But in a handful of outliers (e.g., Georgia, Indiana, Missouri), the median
legislator is negatively responsive; as public opinion swings one way, she moves
in the opposite direction. Also notable is the lack of correlation between
alignment and responsiveness at the chamber level. States with high alignment
scores do not stand out for their responsiveness, nor do states with high
responsiveness scores stand out for their alignment. Indeed, the state with the

146
For data on polarization in state legislatures, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342, and Shor &
McCarty, supra note 8, at 546.
147
This conclusion is bolstered by the earlier finding that state legislators typically are more extreme than
their constituents. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. However, the relationship between polarization
and misalignment likely is more complex than a simple correlation, and warrants further investigation.
148
We do not have enough voting record data from the 2013 sessions to produce reliable estimates for
legislators elected in 2012.
149
This result is confirmed by another recent study of alignment, which also finds that today’s Republican
state legislators are more ideologically distant from their constituents than are Democratic representatives. See
Shor, supra note 67, at 11-15. However, the trends in polarization, at least at the national level, are quite
different. Republican members of Congress have been growing steadily more conservative since the late 1970s,
while their Democratic colleagues have been growing slightly more liberal for about half a century. Nothing in
particular changed in 2006. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.voteview.org/ political_polarization.asp.
150
See Shor, supra note 67, at 16 (finding that “Republican-held chambers are more conservative than
state opinion, while Democratic-held chambers are mostly, but not always, more liberal than their states”); cf.
Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 157 (observing a similar pattern with respect to outcome alignment).
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lowest responsiveness in the country, Georgia, is one of the best in terms of
alignment.
Lastly, Figure 4’s two charts present the trends in chamber-level alignment
and responsiveness over the last two decades.151 (There are fewer data points in
the second chart because, as noted earlier, we use only presidential election years
and ensuing legislative sessions to calculate responsiveness.152) Unlike with
district-level alignment, no obvious patterns are discernible in these charts. If one
squints, the median legislator seems too conservative in the 1990s, too liberal in
the 2000s, and too conservative again today, but the deviations are quite small.
Responsiveness also has hovered around almost exactly the same value for the
entire period of our analysis. At least at this level of aggregation, state legislative
representation in America appears remarkably static.

151
152

Again, we have too little voting record data to show results for 2012/2013. See supra note 148.
See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRICT-LEVEL ALIGNMENT BY STATE AND OVER TIME
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FIGURE 3: CHAMBER-LEVEL ALIGNMENT AND RESPONSIVENESS BY STATE
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FIGURE 4: CHAMBER-LEVEL ALIGNMENT AND RESPONSIVENESS OVER TIME
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2. Franchise Access
Having presented the summary statistics for alignment and responsiveness,
we now proceed to the key question that this Article seeks to answer: how
representation is affected by different electoral policies. We begin our discussion
with laws that alter people’s access to the franchise. These laws include both
measures that make it more difficult to vote (such as identification requirements,
proof-of-citizenship requirements, and the disenfranchisement of felons) and
measures that make voting easier (such as early voting and same-day
registration).153
In the literature, photo identification requirements are the most thoroughly
studied of these policies, and the prevailing view is that they have only a
marginal impact on the parties’ electoral performances.154 A plausible hypothesis,
then, is that the requirements also have little effect on the electorate’s policy
views, and so little effect on representation. Scholars have found as well that the
adoption of same-day registration produces a mild pro-Democratic swing, while
early voting and felon disenfranchisement modestly benefit Republicans.155 Since
these policies do seem to have partisan consequences, it is reasonable to expect
them to influence representation too. If the electorate’s partisan preferences
change because of the policies, it would not be surprising for its policy
preferences to shift in tandem.
Unfortunately, we cannot use the presidential vote here to measure
constituent opinion. Franchise access policies, unlike all the other laws we study,
affect who votes in the first place (rather than how legislators represent their
constituents). It thus is illogical to examine the policies’ impact on the
representation of actual voters. The whole point of the policies is that they may
change who these voters are. In place of the presidential vote, then, we use the
Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores, which capture the ideology of citizens rather
than of voters.156 Since franchise access policies do not affect citizenship, they
are capable of influencing how citizens are represented. The policies are
endogenous to the electorate but exogenous to the citizenry as a whole.
While the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores make it possible to assess
franchise access policies, they have the drawback of being available only for the
2004–2011 period in its entirety.157 We therefore are limited to studying districtlevel and chamber-level alignment during this timespan. We also cannot study
responsiveness at all, because we have no change over time in our measure of

153

See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing franchise access policies in our database).
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
155
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
156
See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 330 (noting that their “super-survey” includes “275,000
citizens in all 50 states”). Our use of the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores means that, in this section, we are
studying the representation of the median citizen, not the median voter. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at
325 (noting that franchise access restrictions can produce “divergence between the median actual voter and the
median eligible voter who would have gone to the polls in the absence of the restrictions”).
157
See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332.
154
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constituent opinion.158 Despite these constraints, we believe the analysis we carry
out is quite valuable. Franchise access policies have attracted a good deal of
attention in recent years, but their implications for representation have yet to be
examined.
As shown in Figure 5, then,159 we find that the restrictive policies in our
database have ambiguous effects on district-level and chamber-level alignment.
At the district level, strict requirements for non-photo identification are
misaligning for Democrats, while proof-of-citizenship requirements are aligning
for them. At the chamber level, strict requirements for photo identification are
misaligning, flexible requirements for non-photo identification are weakly
misaligning,160 and flexible requirements for photo identification are aligning.
Our findings are more intelligible for policies that expand access to the franchise.
None of these policies has a significant impact at the chamber level, while early
voting is aligning for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level.
On balance, these results support the hypothesis that identification
requirements have a minor impact on representation. Just as they barely alter the
parties’ vote shares, so too do they have either unclear effects or none at all on
district-level and chamber-level alignment. However, the measures’ chamberlevel consequences provide some cause for concern (or, at least, further study).
While the relevant coefficients do not all point in the same direction, they do
suggest that identification requirements are more likely to be misaligning than
aligning. Perhaps the requirements produce non-congruence that is too minor to
register at the district level, but that aggregates into more substantial
misalignment at the chamber level.
The results also bolster the hypothesis that early voting influences
representation. The practice is linked to improved alignment for both Democrats
and Republicans at the district level (though not at the chamber level). A possible
explanation is that early voting increases turnout and so shrinks the gap between
the median actual voter (to whom legislators may be especially attentive) and the
median citizen included in Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s surveys. In other words,
early voting may make the median citizen more electorally significant to
legislators, and so motivate them to better align their positions with hers.161
However, the results do not substantiate the hypotheses that same-day
registration and felon disenfranchisement have significant impacts on
representation. These measures do not influence alignment by either Democrats
or Republicans, at either the district or chamber levels. Why not? With respect to
same-day registration, one possibility is that the voters who take advantage of the

158
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining that responsiveness cannot be calculated unless
measures of constituent and legislator opinion both vary over time).
159
We use coefficient charts rather than data tables to present the results of all of our regressions. The dot
for each policy represents its regression coefficient, while the lines to each side indicate the standard errors (at
the 5% significance level).
160
We refer to effects as “weak” when they are significant only at the 10% level. For details on different
identification requirements, see Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 122.
161
Though this hypothesis would not explain why early voting has a partisan valence in favor of
Republicans. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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policy are more likely to be Democrats, but not more likely to be liberals. The
partisanship of the median voter thus might shift even as her ideology remains
constant.162 And with respect to felon disenfranchisement, opinion surveys tend
to exclude felons from their coverage.163 So felons’ views likely are omitted from
the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores that serve here as our benchmark of
constituents’ preferences.

162
Cf. Burden et al., supra note 39, at 6-7 (observing that franchise access policies have various electoral
and ideological effects that interrelate in complex ways).
163
See Daniel Horn, Survey Research on the Political and Economic Attitudes of Felony Offenders in
North Carolina 1 (2012) (“Felon populations are generally excluded from social and economic surveys
distributed both nationally and sub nationally.”).
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FIGURE 5: FRANCHISE ACCESS REGRESSION RESULTS
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3. Party Regulation
We look next at regulations of political parties: measures that specify the
type of primary a party must hold or that restrict candidates’ access to the ballot
itself. Our database includes several kinds of more inclusive primaries (semiclosed, semi-open, open, and nonpartisan),164 as well as one ballot access
requirement: sore loser laws, which ban candidates who lose in the primaries
from running again in the general election.165 As noted earlier, the literature on
primary type is mixed, with studies coming to different conclusions as to whether
it is linked to legislative polarization.166 In contrast, the lone study on sore loser
laws found that they increase polarization.167 Assuming that representation and
polarization are negatively related,168 we are left with no clear hypothesis as to
the impact of primary type on alignment and responsiveness. But we might
expect sore loser laws to cause scores on both metrics to decline.
Unlike in the previous section,169 here there is no obstacle to using the
presidential vote as our measure of voters’ preferences. To the extent party
regulations affect representation, they do so by changing the stances taken by
legislators—not by altering the general electorate.170 Since the presidential vote
varies over time, we thus are able to analyze both alignment and responsiveness
in this domain. The same is true for all of the other issue areas we cover, and so,
for the sake of brevity, we do not mention our data usage again.
As Figure 6 illustrates, we find, on the whole, that more inclusive primaries
either do not influence representation or actually make it worse. Semi-closed,
semi-open, open, and nonpartisan primaries all are misaligning for Democrats at
the district level. Nonpartisan primaries also weakly reduce responsiveness at the
chamber level (though they are aligning for Republicans at the district level). We
further find that sore loser laws are aligning for both Democrats and Republicans
at the district level. The provisions are aligning at the chamber level as well.
Our results provide strong support for the more skeptical side of the debate
over primary type. This camp contends that more inclusive primaries either have
no impact on polarization or in fact are polarizing.171 Likewise, we find that these
policies are neutral at best in terms of representation, and quite harmful at worst.
Why do more inclusive primaries not attract more moderate voters, and so result
in more centrist candidates winning their parties’ nominations? A large political
science literature offers several answers.172 The primary electorate does not vary

164

The details of the different primary types are not important here, but they are covered in depth in
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339-41.
165
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing party regulations in our database).
166
See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
167
See supra note 42.
168
See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing summary statistics that provide support for
this assumption).
169
See supra Section II.C.2.
170
Though different primary types obviously alter the primary electorate—indeed, that is their essential
aim. One thus could not use primary election results to study the impact of primary type on the representation of
the primary electorate.
171
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
172
See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 338-39 (discussing this literature at length).
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much by primary type; primary voters do a poor job distinguishing between
centrist and extreme candidates; and the donors and activists who drive
campaigns view extremism (on their own side of the aisle) as a virtue, not a
vice.173 Our results do not shed light on which of these mechanisms is most
potent. But any of them would explain why more inclusive primaries fail to live
up to their advocates’ hopes.
As for our finding that sore loser laws improve alignment, it is squarely at
odds with the hypothesis that they worsen representation. One reason for the
discrepancy may be that our analysis is at the state legislative level, while the
earlier work on the provisions examined their impact on congressional
polarization. But even if sore loser laws are polarizing at the state legislative
level too, it might be possible, at least in theory, for them simultaneously to be
aligning.
Take a heavily conservative district in a state without a sore loser law, and
suppose that the loser in the Republican primary decides to run again in the
general election. Suppose also that, with two Republicans splitting their party’s
vote, a moderate Democrat squeaks to victory. Then substantial misalignment
ensues between the Democrat and the district’s conservative median voter. But
the Democrat likely reduces polarization by occupying the ideological center of
the legislature. If this scenario is plausible, then it is not hard to see how a sore
loser law would increase both alignment and polarization. The law would prevent
the mismatch between the moderate Democrat and the conservative median
voter. But it also would negate the Democrat’s centripetal influence in the
legislature.174 Further research is necessary, of course, to determine if these
effects are more than mere conjecture.

173

See id.
The same analysis, of course, applies if a moderate Republican squeaks to victory in a heavily liberal
district in the absence of a sore loser law. We also are aware that sore loser laws may have different electoral
consequences in different kinds of districts. For more on these provisions, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore
Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J. 1013 (2011).
174
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FIGURE 6: PARTY REGULATION REGRESSION RESULTS
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4. Campaign Finance
Campaign finance regulations are the third type of policy in our database,
and they can be subdivided further into three groups: limits on contributions (by
individuals, corporations, unions, or PACs), bans on expenditures (by
corporations or unions),175 and public financing schemes of varying generosity.176
A set of very recent studies assess these policies’ effects on polarization,
generating a series of hypotheses for us to test.177 First, the studies find that
individual donors are ideologically extreme and that limits on individual
contributions reduce polarization.178 So we also might expect these limits to
increase alignment and responsiveness.179 Second, the studies find that public
financing schemes are polarizing because the public funds typically are tied to
the receipt of donations from extreme individual donors.180 So we might expect
these schemes to worsen representation. And third, the studies find that most
PACs are relatively moderate and that limits on PAC donations increase
polarization.181 So we might expect these limits to worsen representation as well.
As Figure 7 indicates, limits on individual contributions improve districtlevel alignment for both Democrats and Republicans, but are weakly misaligning
at the chamber level. Limits on corporate contributions are misaligning for
Republicans at the district level, but weakly increase chamber-level
responsiveness. Bans on corporate spending are weakly aligning for Republicans
at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. Limits on union
contributions are aligning for Republicans at the district level. PAC limits weakly
reduce chamber-level responsiveness. And partial public financing is misaligning
for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level, while full public
financing is misaligning for Republicans at the district level.
These results are consistent (for the most part182) with our hypotheses as to
how individual contribution limits and public financing affect representation.
Individual limits reduce polarization and, as expected, improve alignment. When
legislators’ ideal points shift toward the center after donations from extreme
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These bans are no longer constitutional after Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing campaign finance regulations in our database).
The vast majority of states have disclosure requirements as well. We omit these requirements from our analysis
because they are ubiquitous and because we do not expect them to have any connection to alignment or
responsiveness.
177
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 48 (manuscript at
42-48) (discussing these studies in depth). We focus on the polarization studies rather than the literature on the
partisan effects of campaign finance regulations, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text, because they
are related more closely to our subject matter of representation.
178
See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
179
The reason for this expectation is, again, the apparent negative relationship between polarization and
representation. See supra notes 146, 147, 168 and accompanying text.
180
See supra note 56.
181
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the polarizing effects of limits on
corporate or union contributions have yet to be investigated. The literature thus does not give rise to any
hypotheses on these limits’ implications for alignment and responsiveness.
182
The main exception is our finding that individual limits are misaligning at the chamber level. Because
this finding is relatively weak (with significance only at the 10% level), and is contradicted by our district-level
results, we put relatively little stock in it.
176
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individual donors are curbed, the outcomes are a smaller gap between the parties
at the legislative level—and a smaller gap between legislators and their
constituents at the district level. Similarly, public financing exacerbates
polarization and, as expected, worsens alignment. Candidates’ need to raise
money from extreme individual donors, in order to qualify for public funds,
motivates them to migrate toward the ideological fringes. The consequences are a
more polarized legislature as well as legislators who are less aligned with their
constituents.
On the other hand, our findings provide scant support for the hypothesis that
PAC limits worsen representation. The coefficients for these measures do not rise
to statistical significance in any of our alignment models, and only weakly
suggest a decline in responsiveness. Since past studies conclude that PAC limits
are only modestly polarizing,183 these marginal results are not overly surprising.
We also had no a priori expectations as to the effects of corporate or union
restrictions184—but, if we had, they would not have been confirmed by our
equivocal outcomes. In the models in which they are significant, corporate
contribution limits worsen district-level alignment for Republicans but weakly
improve responsiveness; while in the models in which they are significant,
corporate spending bans boost district-level alignment for Republicans and
chamber-level alignment. Likewise, union limits rise to statistical significance in
just one of our models (Republican district-level alignment). Corporate and union
restrictions plainly are worth further study, but for now the safest conclusion is
that their implications for representation remain uncertain.

183

See Barber, supra note 53, at 38 (finding that effects of PAC limits on polarization are substantially
smaller than those of individual limits).
184
See supra note 181.
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FIGURE 7: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGRESSION RESULTS

Realities of Reform

44

5. Redistricting
Redistricting is our fourth issue area, and it includes two kinds of policies:
line-drawing criteria (compactness, respect for political subdivisions, respect for
communities of interest, respect for prior district cores, and incumbent
protection) and line-drawing institutions (legislature, independent commission, or
court).185 As to criteria, the existing literature is inconclusive but suggests that
their effects may vary by electoral level. At the district level, requirements such
as compactness and respect for political subdivisions may improve representation
by making constituencies more intelligible to voters and legislators.186 But at the
chamber level, these criteria may weaken representation by increasing the
likelihood of plans that favor a particular party: the Republicans, whose
supporters usually are distributed more efficiently when the criteria are
satisfied.187 As to institutions, past studies find that commissions and courts tend
to enact fairer and more competitive plans than legislatures.188 So we might
expect these bodies to be linked to heightened chamber-level alignment and
responsiveness as well.
As Figure 8 shows, compactness is aligning for both Democrats and
Republicans at the district level, and misaligning at the chamber level. Respect
for political subdivisions is aligning for Republicans but misaligning for
Democrats at the district level, and also weakly increases chamber-level
responsiveness. Respect for prior district cores is weakly aligning for Democrats
at the district level, and misaligning at the chamber level. Incumbent protection is
misaligning for Democrats at the district level, and weakly aligning at the
chamber level. Commission usage is misaligning for Democrats and Republicans
at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. And court usage is aligning
for Democrats at the district level.
On balance, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that redistricting
criteria improve representation at the district level but weaken it at the chamber
level. Compactness and respect for prior district cores fit this narrative especially
well, as they both increase district-level but reduce chamber-level alignment. In
contrast, the story is more ambiguous for requirements such as respect for
political subdivisions and incumbent protection. To the extent the narrative holds,
it reveals yet another tradeoff in a domain that already is full of them. By
adhering to traditional criteria when they craft districts, line-drawers promote
closer alignment between voters and their individual representatives—a laudable
goal. But, in so doing, line-drawers often produce a divergence between the
state’s median voter and the chamber’s median legislator—an obviously

185
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing redistricting policies in our database). We also
include the presence of divided government in our models, but do not discuss it further since it is not an actual
policy choice.
186
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and
the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1471-72 (2012) (discussing relevant studies).
187
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
188
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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unwelcome outcome. Whether to employ traditional criteria turns out to be a
Hobbesian choice.
Fortunately, the institutional question is not as vexing. The results support
the hypothesis that independent commissions (though not courts189) improve
representation at the chamber level. District plans drawn by commissions indeed
feature higher levels of chamber-level alignment than plans drawn by the elected
branches. This finding means that the benefits of commissions are not limited to
the fairer conversion of the parties’ votes into legislative seats.190 Rather, the
benefits extend to the congruence of the pivotal legislator with the state’s median
voter. Institutional choice makes a substantive difference.

189
We also are unsure what to make of our district-level findings that commissions are misaligning for
Democrats and Republicans and courts are aligning for Democrats. We had no hypotheses as to these
institutions’ district-level effects, but they are worth further investigation.
190
See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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6. Governmental Structure
Our fifth and final set of policies relate to governmental structure generally
rather than election law specifically. These measures include the availability of
the voter initiative, the ability to recall legislators, the presence of legislative term
limits, and the level of legislative professionalism.191 Of these policies, the voter
initiative is the most extensively researched.192 But the prior literature on the
initiative’s effects on alignment and responsiveness is indeterminate,193 leaving
us with no clear hypothesis as to its impact on representation. The literature on
term limits and legislative professionalism is mixed as well (though mildly
positive),194 and no study to date has examined the link between the legislator
recall and representation. We thus have no strong expectations as to these
policies’ consequences either.
As Figure 9 illustrates, the voter initiative is misaligning for Democrats at the
district level, and aligning at the chamber level. It also reduces chamber-level
responsiveness. The legislator recall is misaligning at the chamber level. Term
limits are misaligning for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level.
And legislative professionalism is misaligning for Democrats at the district level.
These results tend to bolster the pessimistic position in the debate over the
voter initiative. While we do find that the initiative is aligning at the chamber
level, we also find that it is misaligning for Democrats at the district level and
reduces chamber-level responsiveness. We cannot conclude that the initiative
improves representation overall, especially since we have no theoretical reason to
discount the adverse findings. Apparently, the mechanism through which the
initiative is said to boost alignment and responsiveness—legislators voting in
accordance with their constituents’ views in order to avoid reversal by
referendum195—operates rather fitfully.
The results also help resolve the dispute over the representational effects of
term limits. At the district level, both Democrats and Republicans are somewhat
more misaligned with their constituents in states that limit legislative terms. Our
models do not explain why term limits exert this negative influence on alignment.
But they do suggest that the critics’ claims—that term limits prevent legislators
from developing valuable expertise, and reduce their incentives to attend closely
to their constituents—are more persuasive than the rejoinders.196
Lastly, the results are no help either to backers of greater legislative
professionalism. Democrats are more misaligned with their constituents in states
with more professional legislatures, while professionalism has no impact in any

191
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing governmental structure provisions in our
database).
192
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
193
See id.
194
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
195
See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (observing that threat of being overruled “may then spur
elected officials to make changes in their policy choices as a means of avoiding a ballot measure”).
196
See Lynda W. Powell et al., Constituent Attention and Interest Representation, in INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF TERM LIMITS 38, 38-39 (Karl T. Kurtz et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing reasons why term limits might improve or weaken representation).
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of the other models. How might legislative professionalism reduce district-level
preference alignment while perhaps increasing chamber-level outcome alignment
(as the literature hints)?197 The question requires further study, but one possibility
is that parties in states with more professional legislatures are more disciplined
and more motivated to attain (and retain) majority status.198 Such parties might
pressure legislators to cast votes that are out of sync with the legislators’ own
constituents, but that are congruent with the views of the state’s median voter. In
this way, the parties simultaneously would promote district-level misalignment
and chamber-level alignment.

197

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (noting that “[s]eats in professional chambers are also more
valuable”).
198
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FIGURE 9: GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE REGRESSION RESULTS
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7. Electoral Policies in Combination
We conclude this Part by examining most of the electoral policies in our
database in unison. These sorts of “kitchen sink” models serve as robustness
checks for our earlier results, while also illuminating the operations of states’
electoral systems in their full complexity. To avoid overwhelming readers with
extraneous detail, we focus on the key points that emerge from these broader
models. We also omit franchise access policies from our analysis because, as
noted above, they cannot be assessed using the presidential vote.199
Beginning with party regulations, then, we find that they have largely the
same effects that we identified previously. As Figure 10 indicates, more inclusive
primaries have no impact or worsen alignment or responsiveness in most models,
while sore loser laws are aligning at both the district and chamber levels. It is
worth noting, though, that semi-open and nonpartisan primaries now are slightly
aligning for Republicans at the district level. It thus is possible that these
measures’ consequences vary by party. Next, our findings for campaign finance
regulations also hold steady for the most part. Individual contribution limits
remain aligning for Republicans at the district level, though they no longer rise to
statistical significance for Democrats. Similarly, both types of public financing
continue to be misaligning for Republicans at the district level. However, full
public financing now is aligning for Democrats at the district level.
Third, our results for redistricting policies essentially are unchanged from
before. Line-drawing criteria such as compactness again are aligning at the
district level and misaligning at the chamber level. (Though the district-level
effects no longer register for respect for prior district cores.) Likewise, the use of
independent commissions to draw district lines again improves chamber-level
alignment. Lastly, the kitchen sink models require us to amend some of our
assessments of governmental structure provisions. The voter initiative no longer
worsens alignment at the district level or responsiveness at the chamber level, but
remains aligning at the chamber level. So its impact on representation may be
more positive than we surmised earlier. Analogously, term limits no longer are
misaligning at the district level and indeed are mildly aligning at the chamber
level. So their influence also may be more beneficial than we suggested
previously.
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FIGURE 10: ELECTORAL POLICIES REGRESSION RESULTS
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8. Robustness Checks
While the kitchen-sink models are our most important robustness checks, we
also validate our results in four additional ways. First, we rerun our
responsiveness models using different dependent and independent variables.200
Specifically, we use the change in the median legislator ideal point divided by the
change in the statewide presidential vote as the dependent variable, and the
electoral policies themselves (not their interactions with the change in the
statewide presidential vote) as the independent variables.201 This approach makes
responsiveness itself the dependent variable, and it means that the policies’
coefficients can be interpreted as their direct effects on responsiveness. The
approach also confirms that electoral reforms have next to no impact on
responsiveness. In all of these models, not a single policy attains statistical
significance. Responsiveness thus seems almost impossible to influence no
matter how it is measured.
Second, we exclude from our district-level alignment analysis states for
which our estimates of the presidential vote aggregated by state legislative
districts are less accurate.202 In their work on using county-level election results
to approximate district-level results, Carl Klarner and Lockwood Reynolds
conclude that the procedure is substantially less reliable in states whose countydistrict “concordance” is 0.25 or below.203 We thus remove these largely
northeastern states (Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont)
from our database,204 and then rerun our district-level alignment models. Our
results are largely unchanged. In fact, almost all of the coefficients are similarly
signed and sized, and the only notable differences are that open primaries now
are aligning for Republicans, individual contribution limits no longer are aligning
for Republicans, commission usage no longer is misaligning for Republicans, and
the legislator recall now is aligning for Democrats. Given the large number of
policies in the models, these strike us as fairly minor variations.
Third, to ensure that our findings are not being driven by slight policy
differences, we consolidate our array of reforms into the following categories: all
franchise restrictions (identification requirements, proof-of-citizenship
requirements, and felon disenfranchisement); all franchise expansions (early
voting and same-day registration); all open primaries (semi-closed, semi-open,
open, and nonpartisan); all organizational campaign finance limits (on
corporations, unions, and PACs), all public financing (partial and full); all
constraining redistricting criteria (compactness and respect for political
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subdivisions, communities of interest, and prior district cores); all independent
redistricting institutions (commissions and courts); and all structural limits on the
legislature (voter initiative, legislator recall, and term limits). We then rerun our
models with these broader policy groupings as the key independent variables.
Our results paint a familiar picture. For example, franchise restrictions
continue to have ambiguous effects at the district level, while franchise
expansions continue to be aligning for both parties. Similarly, the records of open
primaries and public financing remain poor, worsening alignment at the district
level. And redistricting criteria continue to be misaligning at the district level too.
On the other hand, organizational campaign finance limits now seem more
attractive, improving alignment at the district level for Democrats and at the state
level. But independent redistricting institutions now seem less appealing, with no
significant impacts in any of the models. The overall substantive story thus
changes only modestly when we shift from dozens of individual policies to a
handful of policy categories.
Lastly, we replicate the alignment analysis recently carried out by Shor using
same-scale data for voters’ and legislators’ preferences.205 Our rationale for the
replication is that if we obtain similar results using our regression residual
technique, then it must make little difference whether representation is studied
using same-scale data or regression residuals. Shor’s dependent variable is the
distance of each party’s median member in each state legislative chamber from
the state’s mean voter in 2008.206 His independent variables are the ideology of
the median Republican member, chamber competitiveness, district magnitude,
the use of a traditional party organization, and three electoral policies that we
previously coded: the voter initiative, term limits, and legislative
professionalism.207 We also are able to code Shor’s remaining independent
variables. And we substitute our regression residual measure for Shor’s
dependent variable, this time calculated only for 2008 and for parties’ rather than
chambers’ median members.
Like Shor, we find that median Republican ideology is strongly associated
with greater party median misalignment.208 Our confirmation of this “by-now
familiar result” is quite encouraging.209 Also like Shor, we find that use of a
traditional party organization is linked to a significant improvement in alignment,
and that the voter initiative, term limits, and legislative professionalism do not
reach customary levels of statistical significance.210 However, Shor concluded
that chamber competitiveness “very slightly” improves alignment, while we
discern no such effect.211 Shor also concluded that district magnitude worsens
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alignment, while it does not attain significance in our model.212 Still, the
similarities between our analysis and Shor’s are much more conspicuous than the
differences. They lead us to the conclusion that, indeed, representation may be
evaluated effectively using our regression residual technique.
*

*

*

Having reviewed the results of our various models and robustness checks, it
is worth reiterating that they are suggestive rather than definitive. More work is
needed to determine with sufficient confidence how electoral policies affect
representation in contemporary America. Indeed, in the above discussion we
have tried to flag areas in which our conclusions are more tentative;213 and below
we describe several worthwhile sequels to this Article that would add to the
reliability of our findings.214 But it also is important to stress that our results are
the product of a rigorous research design that comes close to allowing truly
causal claims to be made.215 The results certainly can be refined (and we hope
they will be), but they are robust enough already to give rise to clear implications
for courts, policymakers, and academics. It is to these implications that we turn in
the next Part.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
Beginning with courts, then, our findings are most useful in cases where
parties argue explicitly that challenged policies should be upheld because of their
positive effects on representation. Such cases arise with some regularity, and our
findings give courts the necessary tools to assess claims of this sort. More
ambitiously, to the extent that courts are persuaded by either the alignment or
responsiveness theories, our results permit them to start putting the theories into
operation. Case outcomes would shift substantially in some areas if courts were
to focus on representational impact (e.g., campaign finance and redistricting),
while they would be largely unaffected in others (e.g., franchise access and party
regulation).
Next, our results have even plainer implications for policymakers. If they
agree that alignment and responsiveness are compelling values, they should enact
policies that promote them and repeal policies that undermine them. In brief, this
would mean passing sore loser laws, early voting, individual contribution limits,
and independent redistricting commissions; and eliminating public financing
schemes, term limits, and inclusive primaries. Lastly, our findings hold different
lessons for political scientists and law professors (our two academic audiences).
For political scientists, this project gives rise to an exciting new research agenda.
There are many ways to test and extend our analyses, all of them worth pursuing.
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For law professors, our results offer the first practical assessment of a pair of
theories that lie at the heart of election law. Our results also suggest that,
whatever the normative appeal of the responsiveness theory may be, its realworld applications are quite limited.
A. Courts
It is fair to ask whether our findings are relevant at all to courts. The
judiciary, it goes without saying, is not known for its interest in complex
empirical analysis. We believe our findings are relevant for two reasons. First,
parties in litigation sometimes assert that disputed policies should be sustained
because of their positive impact on representation. In these cases, courts need
some way to assess the validity of these claims. Second, courts often have
expressed interest in the alignment and responsiveness theories (and have been
urged by commentators to commit to them more fully).216 Because it is plausible
that courts one day might implement these theories, it is important to know how
the face of election law would change as a result.
Jurisdictions have defended policies on the ground that they improve
representation in several kinds of cases. In litigation over ballot access
requirements (such as sore loser laws), for example, jurisdictions have argued
that they “ensure that a minority of voters do not thwart the will of the
majority.”217 That is, the provisions allegedly prevent the misalignment that
ensues if a minor candidate qualifies for the ballot and then receives enough
votes to change the election’s outcome. Similarly, in cases involving more
inclusive primaries, jurisdictions have claimed that they make candidates “more
responsive to the views and preferences of the electorate.”218 The measures
ostensibly shift primary voters toward the ideological center and encourage
candidates to follow suit. And in campaign finance cases, jurisdictions have
contended that regulations induce officeholders to “decide issues [based on] . . .
the desires of their constituencies” and not “according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions.”219 Regulations, in other words, are said
to tether politicians’ voting records to their constituents’ preferences.
In all of these cases, the parties’ arguments force courts to confront difficult
empirical questions. How often do sore loser laws prevent wrong-winner
outcomes? Do candidates become more responsive to voters when more inclusive
primaries are adopted? Do campaign finance regulations make it more likely that
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For discussions of the role that alignment and responsiveness have played in the Supreme Court’s
existing doctrine, see Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 605-06, and Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 316-20.
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Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 56 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that ballot access requirement “seeks to . . . assure that
the winner is the choice of a majority”).
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Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that open primary
would help candidates “appeal to the independent voter”).
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McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that contribution limits address “broader threat
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officeholders will heed their constituents’ wishes? Courts need to answer these
questions to determine whether the policies in fact advance the interests asserted
by the jurisdictions. But, to date, courts have had little to go on beyond anecdotal
evidence, self-serving testimony, and their own intuitions. In its ballot access
cases, for instance, the Supreme Court has not referred to any data on the
frequency of wrong-winner outcomes. Likewise, in the Court’s inclusive primary
cases, an expert report on congressional polarization is the only relevant evidence
that has been cited.220 And no study of how representation is affected by money
in politics has yet appeared in the Court’s decisions.
Now, however, rigorous social scientific results are available that bear
directly on these issues. Thanks to our study, courts no longer need to guess what
the representational effects are of sore loser laws, inclusive primaries, campaign
finance regulations, and the like. Instead, courts may consult this Article’s
findings—and, we hope, additional findings that other scholars will produce in
the near future—and assess with more confidence how electoral rules influence
alignment and responsiveness. In our view, this analysis marks a milestone for
cases in which improved representation is the state interest submitted to justify a
policy. This is an intrinsically empirical sort of interest, and now it indeed can be
assessed empirically.
While our results are most helpful in situations where litigants refer overtly
to gains in representation, they also have potentially broader implications. In
particular, were courts ever to heed scholars’ calls to adopt the alignment or
responsiveness theories, then representational impact would be a crucial issue in
every dispute—not only when raised by a party.221 Then every case would hinge
not on the balancing of rights and countervailing interests, but rather on a
policy’s effects on alignment and responsiveness. What might election law look
like if such a transformation were to occur? Below we consider each of our five
issue areas in turn, painting with a broad brush because doctrinal details are not
our main concern here.
First, the law of franchise access would change only modestly. The highestprofile contemporary restrictions, identification requirements for voting,
generally have been upheld by courts, including in a pair of Supreme Court
decisions.222 These provisions also likely would be sustained by courts
committed to the alignment or responsiveness theories. As discussed above, the
laws’ representational effects are small and somewhat ambiguous.223 Courts
would not be able to commend identification requirements, but they also would
not be in a position to strike them down due to their harmful consequences.
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Neutrality would be the appropriate judicial posture. On the other hand, courts
might be more skeptical of cutbacks to early voting (which they typically have
permitted to date224). Since early voting improves district-level alignment,225 its
curtailment probably runs afoul of the alignment theory.
Second, the Court’s party regulation doctrine would shift even less. In a 2000
case, the Court struck down California’s blanket primary and criticized more
inclusive primaries that are unwanted by the parties themselves.226 Such
primaries also would be viewed suspiciously by courts applying the alignment
theory. At both the district and chamber levels, these measures worsen alignment
(especially for Democrats) or, at best, leave it unchanged.227 Similarly, the Court
upheld sore loser laws in the one case it took in which they were challenged.228
These provisions also would be sustained under the alignment or responsiveness
theories, since they improve alignment at the district and chamber levels while
having no impact on responsiveness.229
Third, the law of campaign finance would undergo substantial modification.
The Court has voided certain limits on donations from individuals to
candidates,230 as well as aggregate limits on individual giving in an entire
election cycle.231 But individual contribution limits improve alignment for both
Democrats and Republicans at the district level.232 So courts likely would
approve them under the alignment theory. Conversely, the Court recently
nullified Arizona’s public financing system because it tried to equalize candidate
spending.233 Public financing schemes also would be at risk under the alignment
theory since they worsen alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the
district level.234 As for the Court’s landmark 2010 decision eliminating corporate
and union spending bans,235 it resists assessment from a representational
perspective. Spending bans have ambiguous effects on alignment and
responsiveness, so it is not yet possible to reach conclusions about their
validity.236
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Fourth, the Court’s redistricting doctrine would change markedly as well.
The Court tends to valorize traditional line-drawing criteria. Compliance with
them is necessary to prevail in a Voting Rights Act suit,237 and deviations from
them are probative both of invidious racial intent238 and, according to some
Justices, unlawful partisan gerrymandering.239 But while these criteria commonly
improve alignment at the district level, they more often worsen it at the chamber
level.240 Courts thus would not afford them such positive treatment under the
alignment theory. Likewise, the Court has not urged jurisdictions to adopt
independent redistricting commissions in its partisan gerrymandering cases.241
But since these commissions improve chamber-level alignment,242 their
enactment would be a higher judicial priority under the alignment theory.
Finally, courts are asked only rarely to determine the lawfulness of
governmental structure provisions such as the voter initiative, the legislator
recall, and term limits. The alignment and responsiveness theories therefore
would have limited judicial applications in this domain. However, in a 1995 case,
the Supreme Court did hold that term limits for congressional candidates are
invalid because they are not mentioned by the Constitution itself.243 This outcome
is consistent with the alignment theory’s prescriptions. Since term limits worsen
alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level,244 courts
should disfavor the measures on representational grounds.
We reiterate that we are offering only a preliminary sketch of how courts
might operationalize the alignment and responsiveness theories. It goes without
saying that our results must be confirmed by other scholars before they can be
relied on in litigation. It also goes without saying that the judicial inquiry under
the theories cannot be as crude as simply voiding all policies with adverse
representational effects and upholding all policies with neutral or positive effects.
Representational impact must be combined with other valid considerations—
existing precedent, judicial capacity, compelling non-representational values, and
so forth—to craft workable doctrine. Accordingly, the above discussion should
be construed as a preview of how election law doctrine might operate if the
alignment or responsiveness theories ever became ascendant. But it is only that: a
preview, not a definitive account.
B. Policymakers
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While a doctrinal revolution would have to take place before courts could
embrace the alignment or responsiveness theories, no such pyrotechnics are
necessary for them to be adopted by policymakers. Legislators, executives, and
bureaucrats who are attracted to the representational values that underpin the
theories simply could start enacting beneficial regulations and repealing harmful
ones. What might a policy agenda aimed at optimizing representation look like?
Below we offer a tentative first draft.
We begin with the beneficial policies, ordered based on our confidence in
their effects. First, sore loser laws are the measures that most consistently
improve representation in our models, boosting alignment at both the district and
chamber levels.245 The relatively few states that lack them thus should give
serious thought to passing them. Second, early voting increases alignment at the
district level while leaving it unchanged at the chamber level.246 It also should be
a high priority for representationally minded policymakers. Third, individual
contribution limits raise alignment at the district level but weakly lower it at the
chamber level.247 In our view, the stronger district-level effects outweigh the
weaker chamber-level impact, and justify the enactment of these limits. And
fourth, independent redistricting commissions worsen district-level alignment but
improve it at the chamber level.248 Since the point of commissions is to make
district plans fairer in their entirety, we think the chamber-level result is more
important, and supports the bodies’ adoption.
Next we consider the harmful policies, again arranged according to the
reliability of our findings. First, public financing systems are misaligning in three
out of four district-level models, though they have no significant impact at the
chamber level.249 The adverse district-level effects are enough to persuade us that
these systems should be rethought (though not necessarily rejected altogether250).
Second, term limits also are misaligning at the district level and neutral at the
chamber level.251 The district-level consequences again lead us to believe that
representation would be enhanced by amending or repealing these provisions.
And third, more inclusive primaries all worsen Democratic district-level
alignment, and one of them, the nonpartisan primary, reduces responsiveness
too.252 But the nonpartisan primary also increases Republican district-level
alignment.253 On balance, these measures do weaken representation, but the case
against them is not airtight (and it also does not extend to other kinds of primary
reform254).
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This leaves us with a hodgepodge of policies whose effects are either mixed
(identification requirements, corporate and union restrictions, traditional
redistricting criteria, the voter initiative, and the legislator recall) or neutral
(same-day registration, felon disenfranchisement, and PAC contribution
limits).255 With respect to these policies, we cannot recommend that they be
enacted by states that lack them or eliminated by states that employ them.
Representational impact simply is not a useful metric for assessment here. At
least until further evidence is available, we thus advise policymakers to consider
these measures from perspectives other than their implications for alignment and
responsiveness.
As before, a host of caveats must be appended to this analysis. Our results
require further validation before they can serve as a foundation for actual
legislation. Even selfless policymakers care about values other than
representation, and there is no guarantee that these values will point in the same
directions as alignment and responsiveness. And many policymakers are selfinterested rather than selfless. These individuals actively may oppose measures
that improve representation—and hence pressure them to take stances they would
rather avoid. All of these points have merit, and their upshot is that the above
policy agenda is necessarily provisional.
C. Academics
Academics are the final group for whom this Article has important
implications. The main interest of political scientists is likely to be
methodological. All of the datasets we employ—voters’ preferences, legislators’
preferences, and electoral policies—can be refined in various ways, as can be our
calculations of alignment and responsiveness. Political scientists probably will
want to probe our techniques (and results) to see if they stand up to scrutiny. On
the other hand, we expect the response of law professors to be more theoretically
inclined. Like courts and policymakers, they may be curious about the
representational effects of different reforms. They also may want to know what
our findings mean for the validity of the alignment and responsiveness theories.
In our view, our analysis tends to bolster the former theory and to undermine the
latter.
Starting with technical refinements, we can think of ways to improve all of
our datasets and calculations. These improvements would go far in making our
results dependable enough for use by courts and policymakers. First, with respect
to voters’ preferences, it would be desirable to have a direct measure of their
policy views that changes over time. Our usual metric, the presidential vote, only
indirectly captures voters’ policy attitudes;256 while the Tausanovitch and

in multiple parties’ primaries dramatically reduced legislative polarization). Another reform that likely would be
aligning would be eliminating the primary altogether and allowing voters to choose among all candidates in the
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Warshaw scores, which are drawn from opinion surveys, are temporally static.257
Perhaps the same statistical method that produces the Tausanovitch and Warshaw
scores could be used to generate a dynamic measure of public opinion. (Though
this would entail at least some loss of accuracy due to the smaller number of
survey respondents in each individual year.258)
Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, our analysis is hamstrung by
the unavailability of reliable ideal points that vary over time. Had such ideal
points existed, we would have been able to include all legislators, not just newly
elected ones, in our alignment models; and we would have been able to examine
responsiveness at the district level too.259 Unfortunately, the accuracy of the
Bonica scores, which are dynamic, probably cannot be improved since the
number of campaign contributions received by each candidate cannot be
increased.260 But it should be possible to produce a dynamic version of the Shor
and McCarty scores, as the analogous NOMINATE scores for members of
Congress are available in both static and dynamic forms.261 Time-variant ideal
points for state legislators would enable further breakthroughs in the study of
state legislative representation.
Third, with respect to the electoral policies in our database, we coded almost
all of them in binary fashion, simply noting whether or not they were used by
each state in each year.262 This approach could be improved by placing certain
laws on a continuous spectrum. For example, contribution limits could be
assessed based on their dollar values,263 early voting could be gauged based on
the number of days the polls are open, and so forth. Even more ambitiously,
certain laws could be coded according to their effects rather than their existence.
For instance, the actual compactness of a state’s districts could be considered
instead of the presence of a compactness requirement, or the use of the legislator
recall instead of its mere availability. It would not be surprising if a more
sophisticated treatment of policies yielded more robust results.
Lastly, alignment and responsiveness can be calculated in several ways, and
it would be helpful to know whether our findings are sensitive to our choice of
techniques. As long as voters’ and legislators’ preferences are on different scales,
an alternative to our regression residual approach is to rescale the preferences so
they have the same distributions. Then voters’ and legislators’ scores simply can
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which is coded on a continuous scale.
263
For an example of a study taking this approach, see Barber, supra note 53, at 30-31.
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be compared to one another to determine their proximity.264 Another option
(though not one that can be applied retrospectively) is to survey voters using
questions that their legislators already have answered through their roll call votes.
Then common-space ideal points can be produced for voters and legislators,
allowing alignment to be computed directly, without any rescaling or residuals.265
And we have limited ourselves in this Article to temporal responsiveness, but the
concept also can be understood spatially. It would be interesting to find out how
legislator ideology changes as voter ideology shifts from district to district (not
from year to year).266
These refinements are very important, and we plan to implement several of
them in the near future (hopefully joined by other scholars). But legal academics
likely are less interested in methodological details, and more concerned about the
substantive and theoretical implications of our analysis. We already have covered
the substantive lessons in our discussions of courts and policymakers, and do not
repeat them here.267 At a theoretical level, the first key point is that the alignment
and responsiveness theories indeed can be made empirically useful. To date,
these theories have operated on quite an abstract plane—exalting certain
representational values, criticizing approaches that neglect these values, and
offering few specific prescriptions.268 But now the theories can begin providing
practical benefits to a range of actors: to judges who want to decide cases in
accordance with them, to leaders who hope to enact sound policies, and, yes, to
legal academics who would like to argue with facts and not just norms. Now the
theories have progressed from the ethereal to the concrete.
By shedding empirical light on normative issues, this Article is the latest in a
long line of election law scholarship. As Pam Karlan has explained, it is common
in the field for courts (or academics) to announce a sweeping new principle, and
then for social scientists to step into the breach to operationalize it.269 This is
what happened after the Supreme Court enshrined the one-person, one-vote rule
in the 1960s; the calculation of malapportionment began at once.270 It also is what
took place after the Court made racial polarization in voting the linchpin of
Voting Rights Act claims in the 1980s; empiricists rushed to compute
polarization in elections throughout the country.271 The same sequence is

264
For an example of a study taking this approach, see Griffin, supra note 129, at 10-11. We prefer our
regression residual approach because it does not make arbitrary assumptions about how voters’ or legislators’
preferences are distributed.
265
For examples of studies taking this approach, see note 130, supra. This method requires the resources
to conduct large enough surveys to generate voter ideal points at the desired electoral levels. It also can be used
only to investigate current (as opposed to historical) representation.
266
For examples of studies examining spatial responsiveness, see Griffin, supra note 135, at 913-15, and
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 17-20. As noted earlier, we focus on temporal responsiveness
because it corresponds better to the value animating the Issacharoff and Pildes theory. See supra note 135.
267
See supra Sections III.A-B.
268
See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
269
See Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Roles of Empiricism in the
Law of Democracy, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2013) (noting that “legal doctrine has asked a series of
questions that social scientific methods are well positioned to answer”).
270
See id. at 1272-73.
271
See id. at 1273-76.

63

Realities of Reform

unfolding here. Academics have asserted that the central concern of election law
should be the impact of different rules on alignment and responsiveness. And this
Article, for the first time, tries to put some empirical meat on these normative
bones.
The second key point for law professors is that the alignment and
responsiveness theories are not equivalent from a practical standpoint. Many
electoral policies have positive or negative effects on alignment—for both
Democratic and Republican legislators, at both the district and chamber levels.272
In contrast, almost no policies have any influence on responsiveness. In all of the
domain-specific models we ran, only a single reform, the voter initiative, had a
statistically significant impact, and even this result evaporated in the kitchen-sink
model.273 On the whole, it is fair to say that responsiveness does not budge in
either direction due to the policies with which states experiment. It is serenely
impervious to reform.
Why is this the case? The third chart in Figure 1, showing change in median
legislator ideal point versus change in the statewide presidential vote, provides at
least a partial explanation.274 As the chart illustrates, there is almost no
relationship between the two variables. Sometimes when a state’s electorate
shifts in a Republican direction, the pivotal legislator becomes more
conservative. But sometimes the pivotal legislator becomes more liberal, and
even more often her ideology does not change at all. Weak and erratic
responsiveness is the norm, at least at the chamber level. Given this reality, it is
not overly surprising that very few policies have significant effects on
responsiveness. It simply is too low and too unpredictable to be influenced much
by reform.
It is possible that this picture would change if responsiveness could be
analyzed at the district level.275 Perhaps the far larger number of districts (relative
to chambers) would permit the impact of different policies to be detected more
clearly.276 For the time being, however, our conclusion is that the responsiveness
theory is much less useful than the alignment theory. Unlike the alignment
theory, it cannot be relied upon to distinguish between sound and unsound
policies, or between doctrines that should be kept and ones that should be
discarded. If nothing affects responsiveness, then nothing can be praised for
heightening it or criticized for dampening it. To be clear, this is a practical
objection to the responsiveness theory, not a normative one. The representational

272

See supra Sections II.C.2-7.
See id. A few more policies attained statistical significance at the 10% level in at least one of our
models: the semi-open primary, the nonpartisan primary, corporate contribution limits, PAC contribution limits,
and respect for political subdivisions. See id.; see also Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 20-25 (also
finding that institutions have little impact on responsiveness at municipal level).
274
The second chart in Figure 4, showing the trend in chamber-level responsiveness over time, largely
confirms this interpretation. Responsiveness barely shifts from year to year, suggesting it is mostly immune to
changes in the electoral environment.
275
It also is possible that the picture would change if a reliable time-variant measure of legislator ideology
were available. Our use of a time-invariant measure biases our responsiveness scores toward zero.
276
With respect to alignment, notably, we obtained more significant results in our district-level models
than in our chamber-level ones.
273
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ideal may well be a legislator whose positions shift swiftly in response to
changes in public opinion. But this ideal is not much help if there is no way to
promote it or to undercut it.

V. CONCLUSION
The most notable development in election law over the last generation has
been the emergence of the responsiveness and alignment theories. These theories
reject conventional rights-and-interests balancing in favor of direct examination
of electoral policies’ implications for key representational values. But, until now,
the theories have been seriously deficient. They have provided no way for
anyone to tell how reforms affect responsiveness and alignment. They have been
caught in clouds of abstraction.
This Article is an attempt to rectify this flaw. For the first time, we computed
responsiveness and alignment scores for many states over many years, and
catalogued all of the electoral policies in effect during this period. We then
explored how the policies actually influence responsiveness at the chamber level
and alignment at both the district and chamber levels. Our results hold valuable
lessons for courts, policymakers, and academics. Even more importantly, they
make it possible to begin operationalizing the theories—to begin converting what
have been purely normative contentions into practical guidance for interested
parties. We recognize that more work remains to be done before a topic as
complex as representational impact is understood fully. But the Article takes a
useful first step in this direction. It starts to pull the theories down from the
clouds.
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VI. APPENDIX
Table A1. Franchise Access and Alignment: District-Level Results
Democrats
S.E.

Intercept

Republicans
S.E.


0.52***

0.16

0.64***

0.12

Relaxed Non-Photo
ID

0.02

0.06

-0.11

0.07

Strict Non-Photo ID

0.35*

0.15

-0.01

0.14

Relaxed Photo ID

0.02

0.12

-0.03

0.06

Strict Photo ID

0.03

0.15

0.00

0.12

Proof of Citizenship

-0.10*

0.04

0.01

0.05

Early Voting

-0.11*

0.05

-0.13*

0.05

Same-Day
Registration

-0.09

0.09

-0.02

0.08

Felon
Disenfranchisement

-0.05

0.12

-0.02

0.08

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.32
0.31
1976

0.33
0.35
1873

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. * p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table A2. Franchise Access and Alignment: State-Level Results


S.E.

Intercept

0.07

0.08

Relaxed Non-Photo
ID

0.04#

0.02

Strict Non-Photo ID

0.08

0.05

Relaxed Photo ID

-0.11**

0.04

Strict Photo ID

0.15**

0.05

Proof of Citizenship

-0.02

0.05

Early Voting

-0.01

0.02

Same-Day
Registration

0.00

0.04

Felon
Disenfranchisement

-0.02

0.04

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.47
1719

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.

#

p<0.10, ** p<0.01
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Table A3. Party Regulation and Alignment: District-Level Results
Democrats
S.E.


Republicans
S.E.


Intercept

0.77***

0.14

0.73***

0.09

Semi-Closed

0.24***

0.03

-0.03

0.04

Semi-Open

0.25**

0.09

-0.04

0.07

Open

0.41**

0.13

-0.13

0.08

Nonpartisan

0.22**

0.08

-0.12*

0.05

-0.36***

0.10

-0.32***

0.07

Sore Loser Law

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.29
0.29
6129

0.29
0.35
6121

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001
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Table A4. Party Regulation and Alignment: State-Level Results


S.E.

Intercept

0.20*

0.08

Semi-Closed

0.03

0.03

Semi-Open

0.02

0.05

Open

0.10

0.08

Nonpartisan

0.07

0.05

-0.17***

0.05

Sore Loser Law

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.46
1719

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. * p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table A5. Party Regulation and Responsiveness: State-Level Results

Intercept



S.E.

0.92*

0.38

-0.01
-0.01
0.03
-0.04#
0.01

0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02

0.05
-0.53*
-0.46
-0.14
-0.36

0.12
0.21
0.44
0.20
0.31

0.00

0.02

Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote
Semi-Closed
Semi-Open
Open
Nonpartisan
Sore Loser Law
Main Effects
Semi-Closed
Semi-Open
Open
Nonpartisan
Sore Loser Law
Change in Presidential Vote

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.36
0.17
317

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Table A6. Campaign Finance and Alignment: District-Level Results
Democrats
S.E.


Republicans
S.E.


0.82***

0.15

0.45***

0.13

Individual Contribution Limit

-0.07*

0.03

-0.09*

0.04

Corporate Contribution Limit

-0.05

0.04

0.15***

0.04

Union Contribution Limit

-0.02

0.03

-0.09*

0.04

PAC Contribution Limit

0.05

0.03

-0.01

0.05

Corporate Spending Ban

0.06

0.07

-0.08#

0.05

Union Spending Ban

-0.11

0.08

0.06

0.07

Partial Public Financing

0.13*

0.06

0.36***

0.04

Full Public Financing

0.06

0.04

0.11*

0.05

Intercept

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.29
0.29
6177

0.29
0.35
6178

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, ***
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Table A7. Campaign Finance and Alignment: State-Level Results


S.E.

Intercept

0.16*

0.07

Individual Contribution Limit

0.08#

0.04

Corporate Contribution Limit

-0.09

0.06

Union Contribution Limit

0.02

0.04

PAC Contribution Limit

-0.07

0.05

Corporate Spending Ban

-0.11***

0.03

Union Spending Ban

0.04

0.03

Partial Public Financing

-0.04

0.03

Full Public Financing

-0.06

0.05

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.47
1719

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, ***
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Table A8. Campaign Finance and Responsiveness: State-Level
Results

Intercept



S.E.

0.56*

0.26

0.02
0.05#
-0.04
-0.03#
0.03
-0.02
0.05
-0.01

0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.04

0.05
0.33
-0.49*
-0.01
-0.44***
0.15
-1.45**

0.36
0.42
0.23
0.09
0.12
0.19
0.55

0.01

0.01

Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote
Individual Contribution Limit
Corporate Contribution Limit
Union Contribution Limit
PAC Contribution Limit
Corporate Spending Ban
Union Spending Ban
Partial Public Financing
Full Public Financing
Main Effects
Individual Contribution Limit
Corporate Contribution Limit
Union Contribution Limit
PAC Contribution Limit
Corporate Spending Ban
Union Spending Ban
Partial Public Financing
Change in Presidential Vote

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.33
0.28
317

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.01, *** p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
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Table A9. Redistricting and Alignment: District-Level Results
Democrats
S.E.


Republicans
S.E.


Intercept

0.89***

0.17

0.41**

0.15

Compactness

-0.42***

0.10

-0.42***

0.09

Political Subdivisions

0.33***

0.07

-0.12**

0.05

Communities of Interest

-0.07

0.05

0.00

0.04

Prior District Core

-0.10#

0.06

0.01

0.03

Incumbent Protection

0.32**

0.10

0.00

0.09

Divided Government

-0.01

0.02

0.04#

0.02

Commission Plan

0.14*

0.07

0.13**

0.04

Court Plan

-0.05*

0.02

-0.01

0.01

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.29
0.29
6177

0.29
0.35
6179

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.01, *** p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
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Table A10. Redistricting and Alignment: State-Level Results


S.E.

-0.27*

0.12

0.30***

0.08

Political Subdivisions

0.07

0.07

Communities of Interest

0.00

0.06

0.13***

0.04

Incumbent Protection

-0.15#

0.09

Divided Government

0.01

0.02

-0.09*

0.04

0.00

0.02

Intercept
Compactness

Prior District Core

Commission Plan
Court Plan

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.47
1719

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, ***
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Table A11. Redistricting and Responsiveness: State-Level Results


S.E.

0.44

0.49

0.01
0.03#
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.06

0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.04

Compactness
Political Subdivisions
Communities of Interest
Prior District Core
Incumbent Protection
Divided Government
Commission Plan
Court Plan

-0.39
-0.02
0.24
-0.02
-0.10
-0.03
0.08
-0.36*

0.26
0.32
0.22
0.15
0.35
0.08
0.20
0.16

Change in Presidential Vote

-0.02

0.01

Intercept
Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote
Compactness
Political Subdivisions
Communities of Interest
Prior District Core
Incumbent Protection
Divided Government
Commission Plan
Court Plan
Main Effects

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.36
0.18
317

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Table A12. Governmental Structure and Alignment: District-Level
Results
Democrats
S.E.


Republicans
S.E.


Intercept

0.54***

0.07

0.35***

0.06

Voter Initiative

0.26***

0.07

0.00

0.06

-0.05

0.04

-0.06

0.04

Term Limits

0.07***

0.02

0.05**

0.02

Legislative Professionalism

0.77***

0.19

0.01

0.16

Legislator Recall

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.29
0.29
6170

0.29
0.35
6166

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A13. Governmental Structure and Alignment: State-Level
Results


S.E.

Intercept

0.26***

0.08

Voter Initiative

-0.41***

0.09

0.22**

0.07

Term Limits

-0.04

0.03

Legislative Professionalism

0.08

0.29

Legislator Recall

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.47
1683

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A14. Governmental Structure and Responsiveness: StateLevel Results

Intercept



S.E.

-0.27

0.30

-0.03*
0.01
0.01
0.02

0.02
0.01
0.01
0.08

0.23
-0.38
0.35#
2.92

0.20
0.42
0.19
2.48

0.03#

0.01

Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote
Voter Initiative
Legislator Recall
Term Limits
Legislative Professionalism
Main Effects
Voter Initiative
Legislator Recall
Term Limits
Legislative Professionalism
Change in Presidential Vote

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.36
0.17
309

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Table A15. All Electoral Policies and Alignment: District-Level Results
Democrats
S.E.

Intercept
Semi-Closed
Semi-Open
Open
Nonpartisan
Sore Loser Law
Individual Contribution Limit
Corporate Contribution Limit
Union Contribution Limit
PAC Contribution Limit
Corporate Spending Ban
Union Spending Ban
Partial Public Financing
Full Public Financing
Compactness
Political Subdivisions
Communities of Interest
Prior District Core
Incumbent Protection
Divided Government
Commission Plan
Court Plan
Voter Initiative
Legislator Recall
Term Limits
Legislative Professionalism

0.65***
0.15***
0.29**
0.40**
0.22*
-0.37***
-0.04
-0.03
-0.03
0.04
0.08
-0.13
0.03
-0.10*
-0.35***
0.28***
-0.06
-0.09
0.27*
0.02
0.22**
-0.03#
0.22
-0.03
0.01
0.43*

0.18
0.04
0.09
0.13
0.08
0.10
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.08
0.17
0.04
0.11
0.08
0.06
0.06
0.12
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.14
0.04
0.02
0.20

Republicans
S.E.

1.53***
-0.07
-0.13#
-0.12
-0.12*
-0.32***
-0.10*
0.13**
-0.08*
-0.01
-0.08#
0.04
0.39**
0.16**
-0.44***
-0.19***
0.02
0.01
-0.15
0.01
0.07
0.01
-0.06
-0.06
0.02
-0.12

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.28
0.30
6129

0.29
0.36
6121

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.01, *** p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, **

0.15
0.05
0.07
0.08
0.05
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.14
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.12
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.09
0.05
0.02
0.17
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Table A16. All Electoral Policies and Alignment: State-Level Results

Intercept
Semi-Closed
Semi-Open
Open
Nonpartisan
Sore Loser Law
Individual Contribution Limit
Corporate Contribution Limit
Union Contribution Limit
PAC Contribution Limit
Corporate Spending Ban
Union Spending Ban
Partial Public Financing
Full Public Financing
Compactness
Political Subdivisions
Communities of Interest
Prior District Core
Incumbent Protection
Divided Government
Commission Plan
Court Plan
Voter Initiative
Legislator Recall
Term Limits
Legislative Professionalism



S.E.

0.14
0.05
0.11#
0.08
0.11#
-0.16**
0.06
-0.10#
0.02
-0.07
-0.10**
0.04
-0.05
-0.06
0.26***
0.09
0.02
0.12***
-0.18*
0.03
-0.14**
0.01
-0.56***
0.21**
-0.09**
-0.02

0.15
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.12
0.07
0.03
0.31

State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.17
0.49
1683

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.01, *** p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
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Table A17. All Electoral Policies and Responsiveness: State-Level Results
Interactions with Change in
Presidential Vote

Semi-Closed
Semi-Open
Open
Nonpartisan
Sore Loser Law
Individual Contribution Limit
Corporate Contribution Limit
Union Contribution Limit
PAC Contribution Limit
Corporate Spending Ban
Union Spending Ban
Partial Public Financing
Full Public Financing
Compactness
Political Subdivisions
Communities of Interest
Prior District Core
Incumbent Protection
Divided Government
Commission Plan
Court Plan
Voter Initiative
Legislator Recall
Term Limits
Legislative Professionalism

Main Effects



S.E.



S.E.

-0.04
-0.05#
0.04
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.01
-0.06#
0.04
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.04
-0.02
-0.04
0.02
-0.02

0.04
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.08
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.09

-0.08
-0.66
-0.93*
-0.52*
-0.28
-0.55
0.74
-1.25***
1.30#
-0.39*
0.19
-1.19#
-0.39
-0.49
-0.34
0.03
0.14
-0.27
0.03
0.79#
-0.07
-0.23
-0.27
0.55
6.74***

0.16
0.68
0.46
0.21
0.28
0.96
0.51
0.37
0.76
0.18
0.23
0.65
1.06
0.53
0.51
0.38
0.22
0.42
0.16
0.48
0.19
0.97
0.90
0.29
1.92

0.00
0.55

0.06
0.98

Change in Presidential Vote
Intercept
State fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?

Yes
Yes

RMSE
Adjusted R2
N

0.32
0.34
313

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.
p<0.001

#

p<0.10, * p<0.05, ***
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